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DOES ARTICLE 17 OF THE MARYLAND DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS PREVENT THE MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY
FROM ENACTING RETROACTIVE CIVIL LAWS?
DAN FRIEDMAN*
Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides “[t]hat
retrospective Laws, punishing acts committed before the existence of such
Laws, and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust and
incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no ex post facto Law ought to be made;
nor any retrospective oath or restriction be imposed, or required.” It is
unclear whether this prohibition should apply only to retrospective criminal
laws or if it should apply to retrospective criminal and civil laws. In this
Article, I begin by looking at the Court of Appeals’ fractured plurality,
concurring, and dissenting opinions in Doe v. Department of Public Safety
& Correctional Services, which, relying mostly on the common law method
of constitutional interpretation, determine that Maryland’s sex offender
registration regime violated the prior jurisprudence concerning Article 17.
Rather than being satisfied with the use of that one interpretive technique,
however, I suggest that using several interpretive techniques—textualism and
originalism, critical race theory, moral reasoning, structuralism, and
comparative constitutional analysis—even when those interpretive
techniques generate different results, provides a richer understanding of
Article 17. In the end, I conclude that the Maryland Constitution should be—
and already is—interpreted to prohibit retroactive laws irrespective of
whether those laws are criminal or civil.
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INTRODUCTION
In Doe v. Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services,1 the
question presented was whether requiring sex offenders who had already
committed their crimes, been tried and sentenced, and were serving or had
completed serving their sentences to register on a sex offender registry
violated Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The critical
question wasn’t whether the law was retroactive—everyone agreed that it
was. Rather, the critical question was whether the law was criminal or civil
and was thus either within or outside the scope of the protection of the ex post
facto provision of Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.2 The
1. 430 Md. 535, 62 A.3d 123 (2013).
2. Doe was not completely clear in stating that it was establishing the test for determining
whether a law was within the ambit of Article 17. Doe, 430 Md. at 551, 62 A.3d at 132 (“We are
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Court of Appeals of Maryland split. Judge Clayton Greene, Jr., writing for a
three-judge plurality including then-Chief Judge Robert M. Bell and Senior
Judge John C. Eldridge,3 understood the question as a choice between stare
decisis and the Court’s in pari materia4 doctrine, that is whether the Court of
Appeals should retain its historic use of the “disadvantage” standard5 or use
the U.S. Supreme Court’s newer “intent-effects” standard.6 Applying the
Court’s stare decisis rules, Judge Greene’s plurality opinion decided to retain
that “disadvantage” standard, found that the sex offender registry operated to
Doe’s disadvantage, and invalidated the registry as unconstitutional as
persuaded . . . to follow our long-standing interpretation of the ex post facto prohibition . . . .”).
Some subsequent cases have mistakenly suggested that Doe states or modifies the test for laws
within the ambit of Article 17. See cases cited infra note 11. But see Hill v. State, 247 Md. App.
377, 402 n.7, 236 A.3d 751, 765 n.7 (2020) (correctly distinguishing cases determining whether a
statute is within the ambit of Article 17 from cases determining whether a statute violates Article
17).
3. The Maryland Constitution requires all judges to retire upon attaining the age of 70, MD.
CONST. art. IV, §§ 3, 5A(f), but allows retired judges to sit by designation. MD. CONST. art. IV,
§ 3A. In Doe, Senior Judge Eldridge substituted for Judge Lynne A. Battaglia. Judge Battaglia’s
decision to recuse herself (following longstanding custom, we do not know the basis for her recusal)
was likely outcome determinative. Judge Battaglia was a former prosecutor (she was the United
States Attorney for the District of Maryland before being appointed to the bench in 2001) and sided
with the government in every major ex post facto case during her tenure on the Court of Appeals
(2001–2016), including in an important precursor to Doe, Young v. State, 370 Md. 686, 806 A.2d
233 (2002) (upholding constitutionality of sex offender registry). See, e.g., Watkins v. Sec’y, Dep’t
of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 377 Md. 34, 831 A.2d 1079 (2003); Khalifa v. State, 382 Md. 400,
855 A.2d 1175 (2004); State v. Raines, 383 Md. 1, 857 A.2d 19 (2004). Once Judge Battaglia
recused herself from participating in Doe, then-Chief Judge Robert M. Bell selected as her
replacement Senior Judge John C. Eldridge, who was decidedly less likely to favor the State, see
Lynne A. Battaglia, Obeisance to the Separation of Powers and Protection of Individuals’ Rights
and Liberties: the Honorable John C. Eldridge’s Approach to Constitutional Analysis in the Court
of Appeals of Maryland, 1974–2003, 62 MD. L. REV. 387, 389–90 (2003) (“[Judge Eldridge’s]
opinions underscore the necessity of protecting the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
individual.”), and who had already signaled his view that retroactive application of Maryland’s sex
offender registry was unconstitutional. Young, 370 Md. at 720, 806 A.2d at 253 (Bell, C.J. &
Eldridge, J., dissenting) (finding that a sex offender registration statute was “broad” and “virtually
unlimited” and dissenting on the grounds that “the punitive effect of the statute outweighs, and
negates, any remedial purpose it has”). A welcome innovation of Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera’s
tenure (which continues today) was the decision to have the clerk’s office select replacement judges
on a rotation system.
4. The Court of Appeals uses the phrase in pari materia to describe its technique for
interpreting the Maryland State Constitution as generally or usually similar to the interpretation
given by the U.S. Supreme Court to the U.S. Constitution. This interpretive technique is discussed
infra at Section I.C.
5. Judge Greene, in his Doe plurality opinion, described the “disadvantage” standard as a twopart test inquiring whether “[a] law is retroactively applied and the application disadvantages the
offender.” Doe, 430 Md. at 551–52, 62 A.3d at 133.
6. Judge Harrell, in his Doe concurrence, gave a concise definition of the “intent-effects” test:
“[F]irst, the court must consider the legislative intent of the statute; second, even if the statute’s
stated purpose is non-punitive, the court must assess whether its effect overrides the legislative
purpose to render the statute punitive.” Id. at 570, 62 A.3d at 144 (Harrell, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
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applied to Doe. Judge Robert N. McDonald, writing for himself and Judge
Sally D. Adkins, concurred in the judgment but rejected the idea of an
independent interpretation of Article 17. Judge McDonald would have
applied the federal “intent-effects” test, and, as a result, would have come to
a different conclusion, finding that the sex offender registry itself was not
unconstitutional, but that the 2010 amendments were intended to and had the
effect of punishing the defendant and, therefore, were unconstitutional.7
Judge Glenn T. Harrell, Jr. concurred and wrote for himself alone and would
have decided the question on the non-constitutional grounds that the State
violated its plea agreement with Doe by trying to impose additional
punishment.8 As a result, Judge Harrell would have not allowed Doe to be
placed on the sex offender registry.9 Finally, soon-to-be-but-not-yet-Chief
Judge Mary Ellen Barbera dissented. Judge Barbera understood the question
differently. Judge Barbera understood the Court’s prior cases as applying the
Court’s in pari materia doctrine by which the Court of Appeals had agreed
to follow U.S. Supreme Court ex post facto precedents absent a compelling
reason not to, and would have followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s change
from a “disadvantage” standard to an “intent-effects” standard. Moreover,
under that intent-effects standard, she would have followed the U.S. Supreme
Court’s guidance10 that sex offender registries did not violate the ex post facto
provisions of the federal and state constitutions.11
7. Id. at 577–78, 62 A.3d at 148–49 (McDonald, J., concurring).
8. See id. at 569–77, 62 A.3d at 143–48 (Harrell, J., concurring).
9. Judges Harrell and Barbera also sparred over whether the State, by requiring sex offender
registration, had violated a term of Doe’s plea agreement. See id. at 576–77, 62 A.3d at 147–48
(Harrell, J., concurring); see also id. at 597–601, 62 A.3d at 160–63 (Barbera, J., dissenting). This
non-constitutional analysis is not relevant to this Article’s analysis of the constitutional claims.
10. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (regarding Alaska sex offender registry). For more on
Smith, see infra notes 177–184 and accompanying text.
I am not certain that the difference between the verbal formulation of the “disadvantage”
standard and the “intent-effects” standard is obvious to a reader of Doe or makes the difference that
Judges Greene and Barbera ascribe to it. A better way of thinking about these issues might be to
examine, as Judge McDonald suggested (and most other courts have done), how punitive the
registration scheme is for the defendant. This topic is explored in more detail in Section VI.A
(comparative constitutional law).
11. For a more detailed examination of the Doe case itself, see generally Timothy J. Gilbert,
Comment, Retroactivity and the Future of Sex Offender Registration in Maryland, 45 U. BALT. L.F.
164 (2015). The caselaw interpreting Article 17 since Doe has been more concerned with making
sense of Doe than making sense of Article 17. See, e.g., Long v. Md. State Dep’t of Pub. Safety &
Corr. Servs., 230 Md. App. 1, 13–21, 146 A.3d 546, 553–58 (2016); In re Nick H., 224 Md. App.
668, 681–86, 123 A.3d 229, 236–39 (2015); Quispe del Pino v. Md. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr.
Servs., 222 Md. App. 44, 51–56, 112 A.3d 522, 526–29 (2015). The Court of Special Appeals has
applied a version of the Marks rule to determine that Doe requires application of the “intent-effects”
test favored by the concurring and dissenting opinions. In re Nick H., 224 Md. App. at 684–86, 123
A.3d at 238–39 (quoting Wilkerson v. State, 420 Md. 573, 594, 24 A.3d 703, 715 (2011)). For more
on the Marks rule in Maryland courts, see Shane M.K. Doyle, The Unsoundness of Silence: Silent
Concurrences and Their Use in Maryland, 79 MD. L. REV. ONLINE 129, 139–56 (2020).

2022] ARTICLE 17 OF THE MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

59

In two previous articles, I have used several theories of constitutional
interpretation developed for the federal Constitution—textualism,
originalism, structuralism, moral theory, comparative constitutionalism, and
“common law” constitutionalism—as tools for determining the meaning and
best interpretation of a state constitutional provision.12 This process has
allowed me to explain and critique the prevailing interpretive methods,
develop and promote a general approach for interpretation, and use this
approach to consider different state constitutional provisions. This general
approach encourages judges to use all available tools to come to the best
possible interpretation. As I explained it:
In my view, [judges] must use [their individual] judgment to
develop the best possible interpretation of a constitutional
provision that is constrained by a reasonable reading of the
constitutional text and informed by the history of that provision’s
adoption, subsequent judicial and scholarly interpretation in this
and comparable jurisdictions, core moral values, political
philosophy, and state as well as American traditions. [Judges]
ought to make use of all possible tools to come to a proper
interpretation.13
In this Article, I begin by looking at the Court of Appeals’ fractured
plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Doe, in which the Court,
mostly relying on the common law method of constitutional interpretation,
determined that Maryland’s sex offender registration regime violated the
12. Dan Friedman, Jackson v. Dackman Co.: The Legislative Modification of Common Law
Tort Remedies Under Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 77 MD. L. REV. 949, 950
(2018) [hereinafter Friedman, Article 19]; Dan Friedman, Applying Federal Constitutional Theory
to the Interpretation of State Constitutions: The Ban on Special Laws in Maryland, 71 MD. L. REV.
411, 412 (2012) [hereinafter Friedman, Special Laws].
13. Friedman, Article 19, supra note 12, at 950 (quoting Friedman, Special Laws, supra note
12, at 467); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 5 (2002) (“[N]o single
grand theory can successfully guide judges or provide determinate—or even sensible—answers to
all constitutional questions. Only an amalgam of theories will do.”); Friedman, Special Laws, supra
note 12, at 412–17, 427–66. Of course, it isn’t crucial that an interpreter uses only the interpretive
techniques I have discussed or calls the techniques by the names I have called them. Rather, what
matters is using all of the available tools to come to the best possible interpretation. And, as
sometimes happens and, in fact, happens here with respect to Article 17, where the interpretive
theories point in different directions, it is the role of the judge, exercising judgment, to determine
the proper interpretation.
Professor Richard Boldt makes a related point about using multiple methods of
interpretation (although he attributes the point to Professor Charles Black). Richard C. Boldt,
Constitutional Structure, Institutional Relationships and Text: Revisiting Charles Black’s White
Lectures, 54 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 675 (2021). He argues that using a second interpretive technique
(in that case, he is discussing structuralism as a supplement to textualism) “has the potential to
broaden the information that litigants are likely to bring to the adjudicative process and to broaden
the perspective of the judges charged with evaluating the resulting claims.” Id. at 693. I think that
the same thing can happen whenever an interpreter employs multiple interpretive techniques.
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Court’s Article 17 jurisprudence.14 Rather than being satisfied with the use
of that one interpretive technique, however, I suggest that using several
interpretive techniques—textualism and originalism,15 critical race theory,16
moral reasoning,17 structuralism,18 and comparative constitutional
analysis19—even when those interpretive techniques generate different
results, provides a richer understanding of Article 17. In the end, I also
conclude that the Maryland Constitution should be—and already is—
interpreted to prohibit retroactive laws irrespective of whether those laws are
criminal or civil.20
I. COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
A. The Opinions in Doe v. DPSCS are Best Understood as Employing
a “Common Law” Method of Constitutional Interpretation
The best way to understand the principal opinions in Doe (Judge
Greene’s plurality, Judge McDonald’s concurrence, and Judge Barbera’s
dissent) is under the rubric of “common law” constitutional interpretation. As
I have described it:
[Common law constitutional interpretation] argue[s] that . . .
judges rely on precedent, rather than authoritative texts, to
determine the Constitution’s meaning. [Advocates for this
technique do not] argue that common law constitutional
interpretation is the best possible interpretive model[, but] . . . that
it is “the best way to understand what we are doing; the best way
to justify what we are doing; and the best guide to resolving issues
that remain open.”
[T]here are two components of common law constitutional
interpretation that, operating together, make this method work:
traditionalism and conventionalism. . . . [T]raditionalism may be
generally characterized as a general opposition to change.
Conventionalism . . . is “the notion that it is more important that
some things be settled than that they be settled right.”21

14. See infra Part I.A.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part VI.
20. See infra CONCLUSION.
21. Friedman, Special Laws, supra note 12, at 462–63; see also Friedman, Article 19, supra
note 12, at 982. For more on common law constitutional interpretation (or as he calls it, doctrinal
argument), see PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 39–58
(1982).
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Following this rubric, Judge Greene’s plurality opinion in Doe doesn’t
really make the case that he is offering the best interpretation of Article 17,
or that his interpretation is truest to the text, or that his is the interpretation
that is most historically accurate, or best reflects the intention of the
constitutional framers, or is most consistent with the moral underpinnings of
the Maryland Constitution and Declaration of Rights. Rather, he simply
argues that his interpretation of Article 17 is most consistent with past
Maryland practice.22 Judge McDonald’s concurrence disagrees with Judge
Greene’s plurality opinion on precisely that ground. That is, for Judge
McDonald, the most important feature of the Court’s precedents is that they
followed federal interpretation, but not the precise content of what those
federal precedents held.23 And Judge Barbera’s separate dissent, while it
takes a stab at disagreeing with Judge Greene’s description of the
precedential history,24 mostly argues that the critical aspect of our precedents
is the determination that Article 17 is to be interpreted in pari materia (by
which she seems to mean identically) with those interpreting the federal ex
post facto provision.25
22. Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. 430 Md. 535, 557, 62 A.3d 123, 136 (2013)
(plurality opinion) (“Here, this Court is faced with a choice. We can follow stare decisis . . . . Or,
this Court can . . . instead follow the [U.S.] Supreme Court’s analysis of the parallel federal
protection . . . .”).
23. Id. at 577–78, 62 A.3d at 148 (McDonald, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 582, 62 A.3d at 151 (Barbera, J., dissenting) (“Neither am I persuaded . . . that
the . . . cases of this Court demonstrate a lineage of ex post facto decisions that demands our
adherence . . . under principles of stare decisis.”).
25. Id. at 579, 62 A.3d at 149 (Barbera, J., dissenting) (stating that absent a “principled reason
to depart” she would have Maryland ex post facto jurisprudence follow federal ex post facto
jurisprudence). Judge Barbera did not identify what might, for her, constitute a “principled reason
to depart” from federal jurisprudence. In a prior article, I identified some principled reasons that a
state court might depart from federal constitutional jurisprudence, including:
1. TEXTUAL LANGUAGE DIFFERENCES, including both where a right unprotected by the
Federal Constitution is protected by the state constitution, and where the language used
to describe a right protected by both the federal and state constitution is so significantly
different to permit independent evaluation;
2. a unique LEGISLATIVE HISTORY;
3. [preexisting] state law on the subject prior to the creation or recognition of a
constitutional right;
4. situations where the DIFFERENT STRUCTURES of federal and state governments compel
different results;
5. matters of particular STATE INTEREST or local concern;
6. unique STATE TRADITIONS; and
7. PUBLIC ATTITUDES.
Dan Friedman, The History, Development, and Interpretation of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights, 71 TEMPLE L. REV. 637, 645–46 (1998) [hereinafter Friedman, Maryland Declaration of
Rights] (footnotes omitted) (citing State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 965–69 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J.,
concurring)) (suggesting that in addition to this list, “I would add virtually anything else, including
the persuasiveness of dissenting or subsequently overruled opinions in the United States Supreme
Court, persuasive decisions of sister state courts, or even a state court’s ideological differences with
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B. Explaining Calder v. Bull
Making sense out of those federal precedents requires a side trip, almost
back to the founding. The case of Calder v. Bull26 concerned an estate issue
arising from the state courts of Connecticut. At issue specifically, was the
validity of a law passed by the Connecticut state legislature ordering a second
trial of the issues. The U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion seriatim,
meaning that each Justice wrote separately.27 Justice Samuel Chase’s opinion
is the most famous and best remembered.28 In it, Chase made three important
observations that continue to influence American constitutional law. First,
Chase proclaimed his support for the natural rights theory of constitutional
interpretation, stating that “[a]n ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a
law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact; cannot be
considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.”29 Second, Chase
expressed his view that the federal ex post facto provisions30 apply only to

the [U.S.] Supreme Court”); see also ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 146–62, 169–77 (2009) (discussing criteria approach). Recently, the Maryland
Court of Appeals added another “principled reason to depart,” which I cheerfully add to this
collection: Where the federal constitutional doctrine is hopelessly confused and deadlocked. Leidig
v. State, 475 Md. 181, 209, 237–39, 256 A.3d 870, 886, 902–04 (2021) (declining to follow federal
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence regarding authors of scientific reports because the federal
jurisprudence is hopelessly confused and deadlocked); see also Jedlicka v. State, 481 Md. 178, 201–
02, 281 A.3d 820, 833 (2022) (describing Leidig).
26. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). For more on Calder, see WAYNE A. LOGAN, THE EX POST
FACTO CLAUSE: ITS HISTORY AND ROLE IN A PUNITIVE SOCIETY 24–28 (forthcoming 2023)
[hereinafter LOGAN, EX POST FACTO].
27. The notes of decision indicate that Chief Justice John Jay was absent. Id. at 386. As a result,
we have the seriatim opinions of Justices Samuel Chase, William Paterson, James Iredell, and
William Cushing, of which I consider only those of Chase and Iredell.
28. Samuel Chase, a native of Maryland, plays an outsize role in this story. In 1776, after he
signed the American Declaration of Independence, he was a delegate to the Maryland constitutional
convention, a member of the drafting committee, and, maybe, the actual drafter of Article 17. See
infra note 65. By 1798, Chase was a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court and wrote the most important
of the seriatim opinions in Calder v. Bull, the most famous decision interpreting the federal ex post
facto provision. On Chase’s life, see generally JAMES HAW, FRANCIS F. BEIRNE, ROSAMOND R.
BEIRNE, & R. SAMUEL JETT, STORMY PATRIOT: THE LIFE OF SAMUEL CHASE (1980); Robert R.
Bair & Robin D. Coblentz, The Trials of Mr. Justice Samuel Chase, 27 MD. L. REV. 365 (1967).
29. Calder, 3 U.S. at 388 (opinion of Chase, J.). Justice James Iredell famously took the
opposite position, stating his view that “[i]f . . . [Congress or a state legislature] shall pass a law,
within the general scope of their constitutional power, the [U.S. Supreme] Court cannot pronounce
it to be void, merely because it is, in [our] judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice.”
Id. at 399 (opinion of Iredell, J.). Justice Iredell’s position in favor of positive law is generally
understood to have prevailed, both in Calder, and in subsequent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.
See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V. TUSHNET,
& PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 75 (5th ed. 2005) (“In one form or another, the
dispute between Justice Chase and Justice Iredell [in Calder] has proved fundamental to
constitutional law.”).
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. § 10, cl. 1.
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criminal laws not civil laws.31 And, third, Chase famously identified four
categories of retroactive changes in the criminal law that he considered to
violate the ex post facto provisions.32
I am concerned here only with Chase’s second conclusion, that the
federal ex post facto provisions apply exclusively to criminal laws, not civil.
In support of this proposition, Chase relies on three categories of argument:
(1) what I call comparative constitutional law, relying on comparisons to
several state constitutions;33 (2) what I call a structural argument, that if the
ex post facto provision applied to civil laws it would be redundant to the
Legal Tender Clause and the Contracts Clause;34 and (3) what I categorize as
an originalist argument, arguing that the phrase, ex post facto, had a wellknown technical meaning limited to criminal cases.35 The U.S. Supreme
Court has largely if not perfectly followed Chase’s dictum that the federal ex

31. Calder, 3 U.S. at 390 (opinion of Chase, J.).
32. Id. at 390–91 (“I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and
the intent of the prohibition. 1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law,
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes
the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different,
testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict
the offender. All these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive.”). To this day, this
quote sets the test for the Ex Post Facto Clause in criminal cases in both state and federal systems.
33. Id. at 391–92 (citing state constitutions of Massachusetts, Maryland, North Carolina, and
Delaware). For the reasons that are discussed herein, neither Maryland nor North Carolina is strong
evidence in his favor. See infra note 69 (regarding North Carolina Constitution) and notes 76–90
(regarding Maryland Constitution). Moreover, Chase cheated a bit by not mentioning the New
Hampshire Constitution, which then (as now) expressly prohibits retroactive criminal and civil laws.
N.H. CONST. art. XXIII (1784) (“Retrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive, and unjust.
No such laws therefore should be made, either for the decision of civil causes, or the punishment of
offences.”).
34. Calder, 3 U.S. at 390 (“If the prohibition against making ex post facto laws was intended
to secure personal rights from being affected, or injured, by such laws, and the prohibition is
sufficiently extensive for that object, the other restraints, I have enumerated, were unnecessary, and
therefore improper; for both of them are retrospective.”). On its best day, alleged redundancy in the
document is a very weak reed for interpreting the United States Constitution. See generally Akhil
Reed Amar, Seegers Lecture, Constitutional Redundancies and Clarifying Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L.
REV. 1 (1998); Robert M. Black, Redundant Amendments: What the Constitution Says When It
Repeats Itself, 94 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 195 (2017). The Maryland Court of Appeals has even
less trouble accepting that the protections of the provisions of the state constitution might be, and
often are, redundant. See, e.g., Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md., Inc., 370 Md. 604, 629–30, 805 A.2d
1061, 1076 (2002) (holding that both Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights and Article III, Section
40 of the Maryland Constitution prevent legislation from being applied retrospectively if to do so
would impair a vested right).
35. Calder, 3 U.S. at 391 (“The expressions ‘ex post facto laws,’ are technical, they had been
in use long before the Revolution, and had acquired an appropriate meaning, by Legislators,
Lawyers, and Authors.”).
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post facto provisions apply exclusively to criminal law.36 And although there
are certainly some scholars and historians who agree with Chase’s account,37
the majority (and to me, stronger) position is that Chase’s analysis was
wrong.38

36. For the history of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ex post facto jurisprudence, see, for example,
LOGAN, EX POST FACTO, supra note 26, at 37–111; Wayne A. Logan, “Democratic Despotism”
and Constitutional Constraint: An Empirical Analysis of Ex Post Facto Claims in State Courts, 12
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 439, 444–65 (2004) (describing the history of federal ex post facto
jurisprudence); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.2.3 (4th ed. 2011) (same).
37. This argument is well-summarized in Evan Zoldan, The Civil Ex Post Facto Clause, 2015
WIS. L. REV. 727, 735–43 (describing arguments in favor of the “narrow” or “criminal-only”
interpretation advanced by, among others, Robert G. Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity: The
Founders’ View, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 489 (2003), and Duane L. Ostler, The Forgotten Constitutional
Spotlight: How Viewing the Ban on Bills of Attainder as a Takings Protection Clarifies
Constitutional Principles, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 395 (2011)). Mr. Troy also supports the “criminalonly” understanding of the federal ex post facto provisions. DANIEL E. TROY, RETROACTIVE
LEGISLATION 50–55 (1998). Professor Zoldan does a nice job of summarizing this evidence but
doesn’t discuss the apparent inconsistencies in Chase’s own opinion, including that Chase’s
“criminal-only” view is in tension with his natural law views or that his structuralist argument, while
avoiding redundancy with the Contracts Clause, creates redundancy with the Bill of Attainder
Clause.
38. Again, this position is well-summarized by Professor Zoldan. Zoldan, supra note 37, at
743–50 (describing arguments in favor of the “broad” or “criminal-and-civil” interpretation
advanced in Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 416, app. at 683–84 (1829) (Johnson, J.,
concurring), and in 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, The True Meaning of the Prohibition of the
Ex-Post-Facto Clauses, in POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 327–41 (1953), to which Zoldan adds his own research about evidence of the
contemporaneous “professional” meaning of the clauses). For other views critical of Chase’s
“criminal-only” interpretation of the federal Ex Post Facto Clauses in Calder v. Bull, see John
Mikhail, James Wilson, Early American Land Companies, and the Original Meaning of “Ex Post
Facto Law”, 17 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 79 (2019); William H. Widen, Original Sin—Calder v.
Bull Revisited (Univ. of Mia. Legal Studs. Rsch. Paper No. 2011-33, 2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1930436; Steve Selinger, The Case Against Civil Ex Post Facto Laws, 15
CATO J. 191 (1996); Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle
of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775, 791 n.51 (1936) (“It seems impossible, on the basis of
authority, to decide this controversy, although [Justice Johnson’s “criminal-and-civil” position]
seems to have [been] the stronger position.”); Oliver P. Field, Ex Post Facto in the Constitution, 20
MICH. L. REV. 315, 331 (1921–1922) (concluding that “[i]t would seem as though there have been
reputable authorities, both past and present, who incline to the view that the ex post facto provisions
of the Constitution prohibited civil as well as criminal legislation, when judged by the intention of
the framers of the Constitution and by the understanding of the people of that day”); DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789–1888,
at 44–45 (1985); see also Dan Friedman, Tracing the Lineage: Textual and Conceptual Similarities
in the Revolutionary-Era State Declarations of Rights of Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware, 33
RUTGERS L.J. 929, 959 n.122 (2002) [hereinafter Friedman, Tracing the Lineage] (reporting that
“the academic literature supports” the broader interpretation); LOGAN, EX POST FACTO, supra note
26, at 28-36, 147-55. To these, I would add, at least, Justice Hugo L. Black (in Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522 (1954), and Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685 (1957)); Justice
William O. Douglas (in Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955)); Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist (in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990)); and Justice Clarence Thomas (in Eastern
Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998)).
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C. Explaining Maryland’s In Pari Materia Doctrine
All of which leads us back to the Maryland Court of Appeals’ in pari
materia doctrine, by which the Court of Appeals determines the persuasive
weight to give the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of analogous
provisions of the federal constitutional provisions when analyzing provisions
of the Maryland Constitution. The Maryland Court of Appeals’ in pari
materia doctrine is a classic “common law” constitutional interpretive
technique. The argument in favor of following federal precedent isn’t based
on what the best interpretation is, but rather which interpretation best fits with
past interpretive practice, in this case, past federal interpretive practice. The
phrase, in pari materia, is from Latin and translates roughly to “upon the
same matter or subject.”39 In legal Latin, the phrase is used idiomatically to
describe a canon of statutory interpretation by which the meaning of an
ambiguous statutory term is defined by reference to another statute on the
same topic.40 Maryland courts, unique among American courts,41 have long

39. In pari materia, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 911 (10th ed. 2014) (“[I]n the same matter.”);
LATIN WORDS & PHRASES FOR LAWYERS 115 (1980) (“In pari materia: Upon an analogous matter
or subject.”); RUSS VERSTEEG, ESSENTIAL LATIN FOR LAWYERS 136 (1990) (“IN PARI MATERIA
. . . ‘In subject matter corresponding in function.’ This canon of statutory construction tells us that
statutes should be ‘read together.’ In other words, we should interpret statutes consistently with one
another.” (emphasis omitted)); JOHN GRAY, LAWYERS’ LATIN 72 (2002) (“In pari materia ‘in like
material or substance’, comparable, of equal relevance in an analogous case.” (first emphasis
omitted)).
40. See, e.g., 2B NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (7th ed. 2009) §§ 51:1–51:8; see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 252 (2012) (“39. RelatedStatutes Canon: Statutes in pari materia are to be interpreted together, as though they were one
law.”); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 205 (2007).
Maryland’s use of the same phrase—in pari materia—as is used in statutory interpretation can be
particularly confusing for the uninitiated, because in statutory interpretation it is a prerequisite of
using the doctrine that you first find the provision that you seek to interpret to be ambiguous.
Moreover, in statutory interpretation, courts generally look to an older law adopted by the same
legislature to analyze as being in pari materia. In state constitutional interpretation, we are
comparing provisions of the Maryland Declaration of Rights to the federal Bill of Rights, where the
former is often newer and produced by an entirely different sovereign. But see infra note 106.
41. WILLIAMS, supra note 25, at 139 n.21, 197; In pari materia, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
911 (10th ed. 2014) (“Loosely, in conjunction with <the Maryland constitutional provision is
construed in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment>.”); see also 2B SINGER & SINGER, supra
note 40 §§ 51:3, at 237 (providing as an alternative definition of phrase in pari materia—and citing
only a Maryland case—“A clause in the U.S. Constitution and one in a state Declaration of Rights
may be in pari materia, and so decisions applying one provision are persuasive authority in cases
involving the other, yet each provision is independent and a violation of one is not necessarily a
violation of the other” (citing Andrews v. State, 291 Md. 622, 436 A.2d 1315 (1981)). But see
Samuel Weaver, Protecting Unbelief, 110 KY. L.J. 173 (2021) (using phrase in pari materia to
describe lockstep interpretive technique used by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Gingerich v.
Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d 835 (Ky. 2012)).
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used42 the term also to describe the relationship between provisions of the
state and federal constitution. Regrettably, it is not clear what the Court of
Appeals means by this description, having used the phrase to indicate a range
of relationship from as weak a relationship as arose in response to the same
impetus all the way to the strong relationship position, which entails a prior
commitment to automatically be given the same interpretation as the U.S.
Supreme Court gives to the federal analog.
Judge John C. Eldridge has articulated the weak relationship position.
Judge Eldridge described the Court’s in pari materia doctrine as meaning
only that the state constitutional provision is “in the same matter” or “[o]n
the same subject” as the federal provision.43 Under this weak relationship
position, the federal interpretation provides a starting place, but is not
presumptively correct or controlling of the Court’s interpretation of the
Maryland provision. At the other end of the spectrum, Judge Barbera adopts
the strong relationship position. She is seemingly ready to commit in advance
to keeping Maryland’s interpretation of its constitutional provision consistent
with the federal interpretation absent “a principled reason to depart.” 44
42. The first use of the phrase in pari materia to describe the relationship between the Maryland
and federal constitutions came in Blum v. State, 94 Md. 375, 382, 51 A. 26, 29 (1902), applying the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), abrogated by Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). Based on the interrelationship between the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, Boyd had created an exclusionary rule applicable to
documents produced in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Following Boyd, Judge James Alfred
Pearce, Jr. wrote in Blum that:
[T]he Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, which are
in pari materia with articles 26 and 22 of our Declaration of Rights, have been held in
Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616 [(1886)], to be intimately related to each other and to throw
great light on each other.
Blum, 94 Md. at 382, 51 A. at 29. I have read this sentence often and, until recently, had always
read it wrong. I had assumed that the last part of the sentence described the relationship between
the federal and state provisions. But that’s not what Blum was talking about. The correct reading of
Blum is that “the rights protected by Article 22 and the Fifth Amendment, and the rights protected
by Article 26 and the Fourth Amendment, are ‘intimately related to each other and . . . throw great
light on each other.’” Carrie Leonetti, Independent and Adequate: Maryland’s State Exclusionary
Rule for Illegally Obtained Evidence, 38 U. BALT. L. REV. 231, 243 (2009) (quoting Blum, 94 Md.
at 382, 51 A. at 29). Where did Judge Pearce find the phrase? It appears that he found it in Boyd,
where it was used in the discussion of two statutes that might have obviated the necessity of
declaring one of the statutes unconstitutional. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 632–33 (“It has been thought by
some respectable members of the profession that the two acts, that of 1868 and that of 1874, as
being in pari materia, might be construed together so as to restrict the operation of the latter to cases
other than those of forfeiture; and that such a construction of the two acts would obviate the
necessity of declaring the act of 1874 unconstitutional.”). Thus, Boyd used the phrase idiomatically
to discuss statutory interpretation. Judge Pearce, in Blum, used the same phrase—in pari materia—
but in its literal, not idiomatic meaning and, thus, imported the phrase into the vocabulary of
Maryland state constitutional interpretation.
43. Marshall v. State, 415 Md. 248, 259–60 n.4, 999 A.2d 1029, 1035 n.4 (2010).
44. Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 430 Md. 535, 579, 62 A.3d 123, 149 (2013)
(Barbera, J., dissenting). I am particularly troubled by judicial references to the in pari materia

2022] ARTICLE 17 OF THE MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

67

Although these two judges have staked out relatively clear and consistent
views on the correct relationship between the two constitutions, other judges
simply adopt the in pari materia doctrine without saying more, making it
impossible to determine where on this spectrum a judge’s interpretive method
falls.45
I am not a fan of Maryland’s in pari materia doctrine or of its better
known and better understood cousin, the so-called “lockstep approach” to
state constitutional law.46 Adherents to those approaches can, however, point
to some demonstrable benefits, including uniformity, legitimacy, relative
ease, and fewer inconsistent outcomes.47 With respect to Article 17, however,
I see no benefits from lockstepping. There is, for example, no law
enforcement benefit for consistency here.48 In such a circumstance, it seems
to me that Chase’s error in Calder and the U.S. Supreme Court’s dogged

doctrine as a reason not to depart from stare decisis. Id. at 579–80, 62 A.3d at 149–50 (Barbera, J.,
dissenting); Leidig v. State, 475 Md. 181, 259–60, 256 A.3d 870, 917–19 (2021) (Watts, J.,
concurring). To me, such a statement gives the impression that the judge has committed in advance
to following future U.S. Supreme Court precedent. If true, I believe this would be inappropriate.
MD. R. 18-102.10 (b) (prohibiting prior judicial “commitment[s]”). See, e.g., Robert F. Williams,
State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-By-Case Adoptionism or Prospective
Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1521 (2005) (“[S]tatements [adopting federal
constitutional doctrine] . . . should neither bind lawyers in their arguments nor the court itself in
future cases. It is beyond the state judicial power to incorporate the Federal Constitution and its
future interpretations into the state constitution.”).
45. Professor Robert F. Williams has said that “[i]t is not entirely clear what the court means
by [the phrase in pari materia], but it seems to be an ‘unreflective adoptionism’ approach.”
WILLIAMS, supra note 25, at 197; see Richard C. Boldt & Dan Friedman, Constitutional
Incorporation: A Consideration of the Judicial Function in State and Federal Constitutional
Interpretation, 76 MD. L. REV. 309, 344 n.193 (2017) [hereinafter Boldt & Friedman, Constitutional
Incorporation] (discussing range of meaning of the phrase, in pari materia, as used to describe
Maryland constitutional interpretation); Friedman, Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra note 25,
at 645, 682 n.111 (same).
46. Adherents of Maryland’s in pari materia doctrine might object to my characterization of it
as a “cousin” to lockstep, pointing to the occasions on which the Court of Appeals has reached a
different result than the federal Constitution. See, e.g., Miles v. State, 435 Md. 540, 548–49, 80 A.3d
242, 247 (2013) (Article 16’s prohibition on cruel and unusual pains and penalties); Leidig, 475 Md.
at 205, 256 A.3d at 884 (2021) (Article 21’s confrontation right); Marshall, 415 Md. at 257, 999
A.2d at 1034 (Article 22’s right against self-incrimination); and, of course, as discussed here, Doe.
In my view, however, these exceptions don’t vindicate the in pari materia approach, but rather
demonstrate its inability to foster independent constitutional interpretation or allow bar and bench
to predict when it might be employed. See WILLIAMS, supra note 25, at 197 (describing Maryland’s
in pari materia doctrine as giving a “mixed message” to the bench and bar).
47. Boldt & Friedman, Constitutional Incorporation, supra note 45, at 342–43 (discussing
arguments in favor of “lockstep” interpretation of state constitutions).
48. In an early article critical of independent state constitutional analysis, then-California
Attorney General George Deukmejian and a colleague argued that having to apply different
constitutional standards would confuse law enforcement officers in the field. George Deukmejian
& Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., All Sail and No Anchor—Judicial Review Under the California
Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 975, 994–96 (1979). With regard to Article 17, there is no
similar concern as it is not applied or enforced by law enforcement officers in the field.
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devotion to that error, could provide a judge with a “principled reason to
depart” from the federal standard.49
D. Conclusion
As described above, common law constitutional interpretation proceeds
from the premise that constitutional interpretation as practiced by judges
rarely relies on an authoritative constitutional text, but instead begins with
past constitutional decisions.50 The twin goals of this school of interpretation
are traditionalism, meaning minimal, if any, change, and conventionalism,
meaning that it is more important that interpretations be settled than
necessarily correct.51 Common law constitutional interpretation can be a
useful, if not terribly flexible, tool.52 In my view, therefore, while common
49. Doe, 430 Md. at 579, 62 A.3d at 149 (Barbera, J., dissenting). Professor Zoldan agrees.
Zoldan, supra note 37, at 775 (“Because Calder is based on faulty factual assumptions, its reasoning
is inconsistent with its conclusion. As a result, Calder does not present a strong case for stare
decisis.”).
I see at least one other “principled reason to depart” from the civil/criminal distinction in
federal constitutional law: The federal and state constitutions fulfill different functions in
prohibiting retroactive civil legislation. See Friedman, Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra note
25. Professor James A. Kainen argues that Chase’s decision in Calder to abdicate federal
constitutional protection from retroactive civil legislation necessitated greater not lesser state
constitutional protection against retroactive civil legislation. James L. Kainen, The Historical
Framework for Reviving Constitutional Protection for Property and Contract Rights, 79 CORNELL
L. REV. 87, 107 (1993). By Professor Kainen’s thinking, it was acceptable for the federal
government to withdraw protection against retroactive civil legislation precisely because the state
constitutions were understood to substitute for the withdrawn protection. Id. Given this, it would be
particularly bizarre for a state court to interpret its state constitution to match the protection that
Justice Chase withdrew from the federal interpretation.
50. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 36 (2010) [hereinafter STRAUSS, LIVING
CONSTITUTION] (noting that “the common law approach provides a far better understanding of what
our constitutional law actually is”); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation] (arguing that the common law approach is most effective at constraining judges);
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 13, at 152–56 (arguing that a common law approach to
constitutional interpretation offers a consistent approach that also affords the chance to reevaluate
the current state of the law); see also Friedman, Article 19, supra note 12, at 982–83; Friedman,
Special Laws, supra note 12, at 462–66.
51. See supra note 21; Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 50, at
890–91 (describing traditionalism and conventionalism); see also STRAUSS, LIVING
CONSTITUTION, supra note 50, at 104, 139 (discussing similar ideas but employing different
terminology).
52. Theories of constitutional interpretation must be simultaneously capable of both constraint
and flexibility:
In my view, any credible theory of constitutional interpretation must avoid the problem
of Lochner [v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905),] while simultaneously allowing the
possibility of Brown [v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)]. An interpretive theory
must sufficiently cabin judicial discretion to avoid allowing the personal preferences of
the Justices to guide decision making, as was the case in Lochner, while allowing
sufficient judicial discretion to permit the change of course that Brown’s rejection of
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law constitutional interpretive technique can make a useful contribution, it
ought not be, as it was in Doe, the only interpretive technique an interpreter
uses.
In the sections that follow, I will explore other methods of constitutional
interpretation to see whether and how they enrich our understanding of
Article 17 and its application to people like Doe.
II. TEXTUALISM AND ORIGINALISM
Textualism and originalism are two separate but related interpretive
techniques. Textualism requires a careful focus on the words, phrases, and,
in this case, the grammar and punctuation of a constitutional provision. 53
Originalism, at least as I understand it, requires the interpreter to attempt to
understand the original public meaning of a constitutional provision.54 In the
past, I have generally treated textualism and originalism as separate
interpretive inquiries. In analyzing Article 17, however, I think it is better to
discuss them together.
Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights was written in three
stages: (A) the first clause, what I will call the preamble, was written in May
of 1776 in Virginia;55 (B) the first clause was modified, and the second clause
written in August of 1776 by a drafting committee of the Maryland
constitutional convention of 1776;56 and (C) the third clause was written by
Plessy [v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),] symbolizes. It is my view that no preordained
system of interpretation can steer a course that safely avoids the Lochner problem but
also permits the result in Brown. That’s the problem with foundationalism. To steer the
proper course requires both the exercise of human judgment and the risk of human error.
Our human system both created and corrected the Lochner error and reached the
transformative decision in Brown.
Friedman, Special Laws, supra note 12, at 415. But see infra note 126 (discussing critical race
theory’s critique of Brown).
53. Friedman, Special Laws, supra note 12, at 427–28, 427–28 nn.83–87; Friedman, Article 19,
supra note 12, at 958. For more on textualism, see BOBBITT, supra note 21, at 25–39 (1982).
54. Friedman, Special Laws, supra note 12, at 415–16, 433–36; Friedman, Article 19, supra
note 12, at 963 n.74. This is, of course, an oversimplification. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman,
Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009) (describing varieties of originalism); Eric Berger,
Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 329 (2013) (same). As discussed in my previous
work, I decline to adhere to originalism as a foundationalist interpretive technique because it does
not and cannot provide answers to every interpretive question. Moreover, the importation of
originalist interpretive theory to state constitutions is beset by both theoretical and practical
problems. See Friedman, Special Laws, supra note 12, at 433–36 (discussing elected judges, ease
of state constitutional amendment, and lack of information about intent as confounding application
of originalism to state constitutional interpretation). Nevertheless, originalist technique and
historical research can provide important information to a careful interpreter of state constitutions.
For more on non-foundationalist originalism (or as he calls it, historical argument), see BOBBITT,
supra note 21, at 9–24.
55. See infra Section II.A.
56. See infra Section II.B.
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the Maryland constitutional convention of 1867.57 I will discuss these three
stages in turn.
Before I do, however, one critical observation is necessary: The phrase
ex post facto is Latin and literally translates as, “from a thing done
afterward.”58 The Latin text itself is unlimited. Nothing about those words
indicates that the prohibition is on retroactive criminal legislation but that
there is no prohibition on retrospective civil legislation. If such a limitation
exists, it must come from a source external to the text.59
A. Virginia’s May 27, 1776, Draft Ex Post Facto Provision
The first draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights was the handiwork
of George Mason and Thomas Ludwell Lee.60 As to retrospective laws, they
wrote in their May 27, 1776, draft61 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights:
That laws having retrospect to crimes, and punishing offen[s]es,
committed before the existence of such laws, are generally
oppressive, and ought to be avoided.62
57. See infra Section II.C.
58. Ex post facto, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2007).
59. Because the critical question here concerns the meaning of the phrase ex post facto and
because that phrase is, without much doubt, a legal term of art, see, e.g., supra note 35 (Justice
Chase describing Ex Post Facto Clause as a legal term of art), it is not susceptible to interpretation
using the latest interpretive fad, corpus linguistics. See, e.g., James C. Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner, &
Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism
More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J.F. 20, 29 (2016) (explaining corpus linguistics generally and stating
that “general corpora are not appropriate for examining legal terms of art”); see also Thomas R. Lee
& Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 807 (2018); Lawrence M.
Solan & Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal Interpretation, 2017 BYU L. REV.
1111; Stefan T. Gries & Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics, 2017 BYU
L. REV. 1417; Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can Increase Originalism’s Methodological Rigor:
Using Corpus Linguistics to Recover Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181
(2017). Moreover, while I think its results can be interesting, I am skeptical that this new tool can
live up to its advocates’ desire to produce objectively correct interpretive results, see Evan C.
Zoldan, Corpus Linguistics and the Dream of Objectivity, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 401 (2019)
(explaining ways in which subjectivity necessarily affects corpus linguistics statutory interpretation
analyses), or that perfect objectivity in judging is really an attainable or even worthwhile goal, see
supra text accompanying notes 12–13.
60. Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 38, at 933–36; Dan Friedman, Who Was First?:
The Revolutionary-Era State Declarations of Rights of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and
Delaware, 97 MD. HIST. MAG. 476, 478 (2002) [hereinafter Friedman, Who Was First?]; 1 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON: 1725–1792, at 278 (Rutland ed. 1970).
61. For the importance of using the May 27, 1776, draft of the Virginia declaration of rights
(not the June 12, 1776, version adopted by the constitutional convention) see Friedman, Tracing the
Lineage, supra note 38, at 936 n.24.
62. Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 38, at 958 (quoting VA. CONST., Decl. of Rts.,
art. 9 (May 27, 1776, draft)). Mason and Lee had considered using the phrase ex post facto but
rejected it in favor of this formulation, which was “thought to state with more precision the doctrine
respecting ex post facto laws & to signify to posterity that it is considered not so much as a law of
right, as the great law of necessity, which by the well[-]known maxim is—allowed to supersede all
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It is hard to know precisely what Mason and Lee meant. I think it should
be read as if it says that any law about crimes (“having retrospect to crimes”)
or punishments (“and punishing offen[s]es”) is unconstitutional (is
“generally oppressive” and “ought to be avoided”) if applied to offenses
committed before passage (“before the existence of such laws”). Whatever it
was intended to mean precisely, however, it is crystal clear that Mason and
Lee’s formulation was aimed at criminal laws only. Their draft language was
circulated throughout the American colonies and, on June 13, was reprinted
in the Maryland Gazette.63
B. The Development of Maryland’s 1776 Ex Post Facto Provision
Maryland’s first constitutional convention convened on August 14,
1776,64 appointed a drafting committee,65 and produced a first draft of a
human institutions.” 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON: 1725–1792, supra note 60, at 278;
Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 38, at 958 n.118. I do not share Mason and Lee’s view
that this language “state[d] with more precision the doctrine.” To the modern eye, it appears very
poorly worded indeed.
63. Williamsburg,
May
24,
MD.
GAZETTE,
June
13,
1776,
at
95,
https://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc4800/sc4872/001282/html/m1282-1119.html;
see Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 38, at 929, 935–36, 942, 958 (describing
transmission of May 27, 1776 draft throughout the American colonies and abroad); Friedman, Who
Was First?, supra note 60, at 479.
At Patrick Henry’s urging, this provision was deleted from the final, adopted version of the
1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights. 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON: 1725–1792, supra note
60, at 285; Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 38, at 958; PETER J. GALIE, CHRISTOPHER
BOPST, & BETHANY KIRSCHNER, BILLS OF RIGHTS BEFORE THE BILL OF RIGHTS 104 (2020).
Virginia’s current constitution contains a prohibition on ex post facto laws, VA. CONST., art. I, § 9,
but that provision was first added in 1830 and is not a direct descendent of Mason and Lee’s draft
language. JOHN J. DINAN, THE VIRGINIA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 62 (2d. ed.
2014).
64. Although this was the first constitutional convention, this was actually the ninth convention
of the Association of Freemen of Maryland. Constitution Making in Maryland, in CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION COMM’N, REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMM’N 25 (1967)
(“What appears in the proceedings to have been the ninth of such assemblies . . . .”); PROCEEDINGS
OF THE CONVENTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF MARYLAND, HELD AT THE CITY OF ANNAPOLIS IN
1774,
1775,
&
1776
(1836),
https://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000078/html/index.html
[hereinafter Proceedings of Maryland’s First Constitutional Convention]; Charles A. Rees,
Remarkable Evolution: The Early Constitutional History of Maryland, 36 U. BALT. L. REV. 217,
232 n.162 (2007); Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 38, at 937, 937 n.26; Friedman, Who
Was First?, supra note 60, at 480; Friedman, Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra note 25, at
639–40, 647; CARL N. EVERSTINE, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND: 1634–1776, at 559
(1980) (“[T]he ninth Convention, being the Constitutional Convention, began on August 14,
1776 . . . .”).
65. The identity of the drafters of Maryland’s first declaration of rights remains a mystery. We
know that the convention appointed a drafting committee made up of Charles Carroll, Barrister;
Charles Carroll of Carrollton; Samuel Chase; Robert Goldsborough; William Paca; George Plater;
and Matthew Tilghman. Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 38, at 1003; Friedman, Who
Was First?, supra note 60, at 480; THE DECISIVE BLOW IS STRUCK: A FACSIMILE EDITION OF THE
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declaration of rights on August 27, 1776.66 It is now well-understood that the
Maryland drafting committee worked from the Mason and Lee draft of May
27, 1776.67 With regard to what is now Article 17, the drafting committee
took Mason and Lee’s language (1) made a few improvements in the
language; (2) turned it into a preamble, and (3) added the second clause,
which became the first68 constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws:
That retrospective laws, punishing facts committed before the
existence of such laws, and by them only declared to be criminal,
are oppressive, unjust, and incompatible with liberty; therefore, no
ex post facto law ought to be made.69
I have previously written that Maryland’s modifications to the May 27,
1776, Virginia Declaration of Rights were thoughtful, careful, and wellconsidered.70 More specifically, I have observed that the Maryland framers
executed a “well-conceived strategy to extend some rights beyond the
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1776 AND THE FIRST MARYLAND
CONSTITUTION, at Aug. 17, 1776 (Edward C. Papenfuse & Gregory A. Stiverson, eds., 1977);
Proceedings of Maryland’s First Constitutional Convention, supra note 64, at 220. We don’t know
who did the actual work of writing the August 27, 1776, draft, but credit has been given alternatively
to Charles Carroll, Barrister or to a team of Charles Carroll of Carrollton and Samuel Chase.
Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 38, at 937–38 n.28 (and materials cited therein);
Friedman, Who Was First?, supra note 60, at 492 n.33.
66. Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 38, at 937–38; Friedman, Who Was First?,
supra note 60, at 480.
67. Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 38, at 935, 935 n.21, 935 n.24, 941; Friedman,
Who Was First?, supra note 60, at 482–83.
68. This was the first use of the phrase ex post facto in a written American constitution.
Friedman, Tracing the Lineage supra note 38, at 958 n.118 (citing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 1 BILL
OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 279 (1971)); LOGAN, EX POST FACTO, supra note 26, at
7; Joyce A. McCray Pearson, The Federal and State Bills of Rights, 36 HOWARD L.J. 43, 52 (1993);
GALIE ET AL., supra note 63, at 155 n.39 (2020).
Professor Haimo Li argues that Maryland’s ex post facto provision provides the
“intellectual origin” for the federal ex post facto provision, at least that one found in Article I,
Section Nine. Haimo Li, The Intellectual Origin of the U.S Constitution Article 1, Section 9, Clause
3: An Important Contribution from Maryland, J. AM. REV. (June 23, 2021),
https://allthingsliberty.com/2021/06/the-intellectual-origin-of-the-us-constitution-article-1-section9-clause-3-an-important-contribution-from-maryland/. While I don’t have a specific alternative
theory as to the origins, but see supra notes 37–38 (and sources therein), I don’t find Professor Li’s
evidence compelling.
69. Friedman, Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra note 25, at 656 (quoting MD. CONST.
Decl. of Rts., art. 13 (Aug. 27, 1776, draft)). North Carolina’s constitutional framers copied
Maryland’s draft verbatim and that provision remains in the North Carolina Declaration of Rights
today. JOHN V. ORTH & PAUL MARTIN NEWBY, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION 63
(2d ed.); LOGAN, EX POST FACTO, supra note 26, at 7. North Carolina’s article I, section 16, uses
the word “therefore” rather than “wherefore” suggesting that the North Carolina framers were
working from the August 27, 1776, Maryland draft, not a subsequent draft. North Carolina has also
added a second sentence to their provision, which provides that “[n]o law taxing retrospectively
sales, purchases, or other acts previously done shall be enacted.” N.C. CONST., art. I, § 16.
70. Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 38, at 946; Friedman, Who Was First?, supra
note 60, at 484–87.
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criminal context and into the civil.”71 I specifically identified: (1) the right
against self-incrimination;72 (2) the right to venue;73 (3) the right to due
process;74 and likely (4) the right to trial by jury,75 as rights that the May 27,
1776, Virginia draft protected only in the criminal context, but that the
Maryland framers revised so as to apply in both the criminal and civil context.
It is possible that the ex post facto provision ought to be counted as a fifth
instance.
As mentioned above, the Mason and Lee draft was focused exclusively
on retroactive criminal laws. Compare Mason and Lee’s original language to
that of the Maryland preamble:
That retrospective laws, having respect to crimes, and punishing
acts offen[s]es, committed before the existence of such laws, and
by them only declared to be criminal, are generally oppressive,
unjust, and ought to be avoided incompatible with liberty.76
The definition of the problem as being “retrospective laws” is clarified.
A description of those retrospective laws is moved between the first and third
commas. And the reason for the prohibition is added at the end. The critical
move, grammatically, was to move the discussion of criminal law to its
current position and therefore transform it into a nonrestrictive appositive
phrase, that is, as describing not defining the subject of the sentence.77 If I’m
right that it functions as a nonrestrictive appositive phrase, then the provision
71. Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 38, at 947, 964–67; see also Friedman, Who
Was First?, supra note 60, at 484–85.
72. Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 38, at 965 n.149 (describing how Maryland
framers, by removing the right against compelled self-incrimination from a catalog of the rights of
criminal defendants, and placing it alone in an independent provision, made the right against
self-incrimination applicable in civil context as well); Friedman, Who Was First?, supra note 60, at
485 (same). Subsequent amendments have once again made the right against self-incrimination
apply only in the criminal context. 6 LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE—STATE AND
FEDERAL, § 514:1, at 301–02 (3d ed., 2013); 2 BYRON L. WARNKEN, MARYLAND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 12-554–12-556 (2013); Friedman, Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra note 25, at
659, 697 n.350.
73. Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 38, at 965–66 (describing how Maryland
framers transformed the right from a right for a criminal defendant to be tried in his vicinage, into
a right to trial in the same venue, which applied in the civil context as well); Friedman, Who Was
First?, supra note 60, at 485 (same).
74. Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 38, at 966–67 (describing how Maryland
framers, by removing the right to due process from a catalog of the rights of criminal defendants,
and placing it alone in an independent provision, made the right applicable in the civil context as
well); Friedman, Who Was First?, supra note 60, at 486 (same).
75. Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 38, at 964 n.148 (describing the possibility that
Maryland framers modified the May 27, 1776, Virginia draft to guarantee a right to trial by jury in
the civil as well as criminal context).
76. VA. CONST., Decl. of Rts., art. 9 (May 27, 1776, draft); MD. CONST. Decl. of Rts., art. 13
(Aug. 27, 1776, draft).
77. Apposition, FOWLER’S DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 60 (4th ed. 2015); see
also Appositives, BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 62 (4th ed. 2016).
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could be read without the nonrestrictive appositive phrase as: “That
retrospective Laws . . . are oppressive, unjust and incompatible with
liberty.”78 In such a reading, the discussion of criminal laws is transformed
so that it is just a particularly egregious example of retrospective laws.79 In
the absence of more evidence,80 I think it is intended to describe the worst
kinds of retrospective laws, but not to define retrospective laws as only
applying to criminal matters. Finally, the reworked language of the first
clause lists three problems with retrospective laws: (1) that retrospective laws
are oppressive; (2) that retrospective laws are unjust; and (3) that
78. Of course, this reading makes the omitted language nugatory and superfluous, which
constitutional interpreters are not supposed to do. See, e.g., Bernstein v. State, 422 Md. 36, 53, 29
A.3d 267, 277 (2011) (“[C]onstitutional provision[s] . . . on the same subject are ‘read together and
harmonized to the extent possible, reading them so as to avoid rendering either of them, or any
portion, meaningless, surplusage, superfluous or nugatory.’” (quoting Whiting-Turner Contracting
Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md 295, 303, 783 A.2d 667, 671 (2001))); Whitley v. Md. State Bd. of
Elections, 429 Md. 132, 149, 55 A.3d 37, 47 (2012) (same). Despite this oft-repeated injunction, I
think that the constitutional framers were entitled to use a nonrestrictive appositive phrase as a
description if they so desired.
79. I think that’s the correct reading and matches our modern understanding of the punctuation.
Apposition, FOWLER’S DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 60 (4th ed. 2015) (“When
apposition is restrictive, you do not separate the item in apposition with commas, but when it is nonrestrictive, you do . . . .”); see also David S. Yellin, The Elements of Constitutional Style: A
Comprehensive Analysis of Punctuation in the Constitution, 79 TENN. L. REV. 687, 722–24, 726
(2012) (describing punctuation of restrictive and nonrestrictive clauses in the U.S. Constitution).
Of course, it is also possible that the material between the first and third commas is a
restrictive appositive phrase and is intended to define the term “retrospective laws” not merely
describe it. If that was the intended meaning, the punctuation is nonstandard to the modern reader,
but the Maryland framers, as was common at the time, frequently employed nonstandard
punctuation. Friedman, Special Laws, supra note 12, at 433 n.118; Friedman, Tracing the Lineage,
supra note 38, at 950. But see Yellin, supra, at 705 (arguing that arguably-erroneous punctuation
marks in the federal Constitution “make logical sense under Framing-era grammar rules”). Under
this reading, the preamble is telling us information, not about all retrospective laws, but about a
subset of retrospective laws; that is, those retrospective laws that punish retrospectively and declare
conduct to be criminal retrospectively. On this reading, the preamble means that retrospective laws
that punish acts committed before the existence of such laws, and by them only declared criminal
are oppressive, unjust and incompatible with liberty. If that is correct, then the operative clause
prohibits ex post facto laws because (cf. “wherefore”) they are the subset of retrospective law that
are “oppressive, unjust and incompatible with liberty.” In other words, under this reading, not all
retrospective laws are oppressive; but retrospective laws about crimes, i.e. ex post facto laws, are
oppressive; wherefore, no ex post facto law ought to be made.
I prefer the first, but I acknowledge the possibility that the second could well be correct.
80. We have no remaining record to explain the convention delegates’ views on the meaning
of the provision. And, as to the public meaning of the phrase ex post facto, we can only guess that
the historical record is completely mixed in much the same way it was thirteen years later when the
phrase was used in the federal Constitution. See supra notes 37–38 (discussing debate about the
original public meaning of the ex post facto clauses of the federal Constitution). For a discussion of
the problem of lack of information about the original public meaning of state constitutional
provisions and the implications of that lack of information for originalism, see Friedman, Special
Laws, supra note 12, at 436–38; see also Ilya Somin, Originalism and Political Ignorance, 97
MINN. L. REV. 625 (2012) (discussing difficulties for originalism posed by public ignorance of the
meaning of federal constitutional provisions).
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retrospective laws are incompatible with liberty. The rewritten first clause of
Article 17 was then pressed into service by the Maryland framers as a
preamble. Nobody argues that the preamble provides operative language. The
only question is whether the preamble limits the effect of the operative
clauses that come after it.81 As a general rule, we don’t give limiting effect to
preamble language, but that rule is neither clear nor consistently applied.
81. Even those who interpret constitutions don’t have much experience interpreting
constitutional preambles. The Maryland Constitution and Declaration of Rights has its own
preamble: “We, the People of the State of Maryland, grateful to Almighty God for our civil and
religious liberty, and taking into our serious consideration the best means of establishing a good
Constitution in this State for the sure foundation and more permanent security thereof, declare: . . . .”
But this preamble has never been interpreted and is probably not justiciable. DAN FRIEDMAN, THE
MARYLAND STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 12 (Praeger ed. 2006) [hereinafter
FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE CONSTITUTION] (updated 2d edition with Kathleen Hoke forthcoming
from Oxford Univ. Press 2023). See generally Peter J. Smith & Robert W. Tuttle, God and State
Preambles, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 757 (2017) (regarding state constitutional preambles). Three other
Articles (besides Article 17) also contain individual preambles, each of which is introduced by the
word “wherefore”: Articles 6, 33, and 36. See infra note 84; MD. CONST., DECL. OF RTS., arts. 6,
33, 36. FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE CONSTITUTION, supra, at 42–43 (describing preamble to Article
36 as judicially unenforceable and likely unconstitutional). Article 7 of the Declaration of Rights
(the “free and frequent” elections provision) might also be said to contain a preamble and an
operative clause. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RTS., art. 7. See generally Eugene Volokh, The
Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 814–21 (1998) (arguing that a prefatory
statement and an operative clause was a common structure among Revolutionary-era state
constitutions).
The preamble to the U.S. Constitution, while well-known, is generally not thought to be
judicially enforceable. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905) (well-known recently as
the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandatory vaccination case, stating: “Although th[e] preamble indicates
the general purposes for which the people ordained and established the Constitution, it has never
been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the [G]overnment of the United
States or on any of its [D]epartments”); see also United States v. Boyer, 85 F. 425, 430–31 (W.D.
Mo. 1898) (“The preamble never can be resorted to, to enlarge the powers confided to the general
government, or any of its departments. It cannot confer any power per se. It can never amount, by
implication, to an enlargement of any power expressly given. It can never be the legitimate source
of any implied power, when otherwise withdrawn from the constitution. Its true office is to expound
the nature and extent and application of the powers actually conferred by the constitution, and not
substantively to create them.” (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES § 462 (1833))); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A
BIOGRAPHY 471 (2005) (“The modern Supreme Court has almost nothing to say about the Preamble
. . . .”). Despite this, the federal preamble is currently enjoying an unlikely intellectual renaissance.
See, e.g., William M. Treanor, The Case of the Dishonest Scrivener: Gouverneur Morris and the
Creation of the Federalist Constitution, 120 MICH. L. REV. 1, 48–59 (2021) (describing claim that
preamble’s authors, including principally Gouverneur Morris, intended it as a grant of power to the
federal government); David S. Schwartz, Framing the Framer: A Commentary on Treanor’s
Gouverneur Morris as “Dishonest Scrivener”, 120 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 51, 56 (2022) (stating
that Treanor’s article “lays the groundwork for a long-overdue debate about [the federal preamble’s]
status”); David S. Schwartz, Reconsidering the Constitution’s Preamble: The Words that Made Us
U.S.,
37
CONST.
COMMENT.
(forthcoming
2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3930694; John Mikhail, McCulloch v.
Maryland, Slavery, the Preamble, and the Sweeping Clause, 36 CONST. COMMENT. 131 (2021);
Eliot T. Tracz, Towards A Preamble-Based Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 56 GONZ. L.
REV. 95, 115 (2020–2021) (arguing for preamble-based constitutional interpretation); John W.
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Now we come to the second clause. In the August 27, 1776, draft, the
second clause began with the word “therefore.”82 Beginning with the
September 17, 1776, draft, and continuing today, it begins with the word
“wherefore.”83 We don’t know whether the change from “therefore” to
“wherefore” was intentional or accidental and, if intentional, why it was
done.84 That is, to my knowledge, lost to history. The word “wherefore”
generally means “why” or “for that reason.”85 I think we can take it, however,
that the second clause means that because of the first clause, the second
clause.86 As noted above, the key phrase, ex post facto, is Latin and means

Welch & James A. Heilpern, Recovering Our Forgotten Preamble, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1022
(2018) (arguing that the preamble “deserves a primary place” in the interpretation of the federal
Constitution); Milton Handler, Brian Leiter, & Carole E. Handler, A Reconsideration of the
Relevance and Materiality of the Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
117 (1990); see also Liav Orgad, The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 8 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 714 (2010) (suggesting increased role for preambles in international constitutional
interpretation). And, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the U.S. Supreme Court
refused to let the Preamble (or as Justice Scalia called it, the “prefatory statement”) to the Second
Amendment—regarding the militia context—restrict the meaning the Court found of the operative
clause: an individual right to handgun ownership for self-defense in the home unconnected to militia
service. Id. at 577, 636; see also infra note 86.
82. Friedman, Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra note 25, at 656.
83. Id.
84. We do know that, during the same period (between August 27 and September 17, 1776),
the drafting committee also changed the word “therefore” to the word “wherefore” in what is
currently Article 33 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, concerning judicial independence.
Friedman, Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra note 25, at 663. The result is that today, there are
four instances in which the Maryland Declaration of Rights uses the word “wherefore”: Articles 6,
17, 33, and 36. Friedman, Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra note 25, at 652, 656, 663, 666.
Each of those uses is non-standard in modern English. Today, we would likely use “whereas,” not
“wherefore.”
85. Wherefore, FOWLER’S DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 880 (4th ed. 2015). The
two words are not synonyms.
86. The use of the word, “wherefore” in Article 17, distinguishes it from the Second
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which lacks any text—just a comma—to explain the
relationship between its two clauses. The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.” U.S. CONST., amend. II. Amici in Heller suggested that linguistically the preamble
to the Second Amendment should be read as an absolute clause, which “functions to modify the
main clause the way an adverbial clause does. In traditional grammar, absolute constructions are
considered grammatically independent from the main clause, but they add meaning to the entire
sentence.” Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English Dennis E. Baron, Richard W. Bailey, &
Jeffrey P. Kaplan as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6–7, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07290), 2008 WL 157194 (footnote omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court rejected that interpretation and
held that the preamble adds nothing to the understanding of the operative provision. Heller, 554
U.S. at 577; see supra note 81, (discussing Heller); Yellin, supra note 79, at 688 n.5 (describing
“diametrically opposed constructions” between linguists’ analysis and the U.S. Supreme Court’s);
see also James C. Phillips & Josh Blackman, Corpus Linguistics and Heller, 56 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 609, 617–18, 655 (2021) (discussing but not resolving complexities in determining the
relationship between the Second Amendment’s prefatory and operative clauses).

2022] ARTICLE 17 OF THE MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

77

“from a thing done afterward.”87 In itself, the Latin phrase does not suggest
a limitation, and certainly not a limitation based on a civil/criminal
distinction. The word “ought,” as used in Article 17, is understood as a
prohibition on legislative action.88 Thus, at least from 1776 to 1867 (when
the third clause was added), Article 17 essentially provided that because
retrospective laws are bad, ex post facto laws are prohibited.89
That same language remained in place when the Maryland Declaration
of Rights was adopted on November 3, 1776, and when the provision was
readopted without changes in 1851 and 1864.90
C. 1867 Amendments to Maryland’s Ex Post Facto Provision
The third stage of the drafting of Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights occurred in 1867, but to understand it, we have to go earlier, to
1864. The Maryland constitutional convention of 1864 met during the height
of the Civil War and the convention delegates were mostly members of the
Union Party.91 The Maryland Constitution of 1864 included a series of “ironclad” oaths, which required, as a precondition to voting and holding office,
that people had to swear oaths that they had not supported, assisted, or joined
the Confederacy.92 A mere three years later, another constitutional
convention was convened, with an explicit goal of undoing the changes made
by the previous Constitution.93 Thus, the Maryland Constitution of 1867 not
only repealed the “iron-clad” oaths, but also amended Article 17 to prevent
similar oaths from being imposed in the future. Here’s the final language of
Article 17 as adopted in 1867 and that continues in force today:

87. See supra note 58.
88. Miles v. State, 435 Md. 540, 555–56, 80 A.3d 242, 251 (2013) (holding that the word
“ought,” as used in the Maryland Declaration of Rights, conveys a spectrum of meaning, but stating
in dicta that “the word ‘ought’ may reasonably be interpreted [in Article 17] as conveying a
prohibition upon the . . . General Assembly”).
89. See supra note 79.
90. Friedman, Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra note 25. We don’t know what the
Maryland framers in 1851 and 1864 knew about the 1776 provision or to what extent they
understood and believed Chase’s view, expressed in Calder, that the federal ex post facto provision
had a “criminal-only” technical meaning. I have found no evidence of an original public meaning
of the phrase, although I would assume that, by 1851 and 1864, Chase’s view from Calder v. Bull,
that ex post facto had a “criminal-only” meaning, had been widely adopted.
91. FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 81, at 6–7; William Starr Myers,
The Maryland Constitution of 1864, 19 JOHNS HOPKINS U. STUD., IN HIST. & POL. SCI., Aug.–Sept.
1901.
92. ROBERT J. BRUGGER, MARYLAND: A MIDDLE TEMPERAMENT 1634–1980, at 303 (1988);
William A. Russ, Jr., Disfranchisement in Maryland (1861–67), 28 MD. HIST. MAG. 309 (1933).
93. FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 81, at 8; William Starr Myers, The
Self-Reconstruction of Maryland, 1864–1867, 27 JOHNS HOPKINS U. STUD., IN HIST. & POL. SCI.,
Jan.–Feb. 1909; Russ, Jr., supra note 92, at 309.
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That retrospective Laws, punishing acts committed before the
existence of such Laws, and by them only declared criminal, are
oppressive, unjust and incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no ex
post facto Law ought to be made; nor any retrospective oath or
restriction be imposed, or required.94
The language that the framers used is important: The particular evil in
the iron-clad oaths was that they were retrospective “because they had the
effect of disenfranchising Democrats for activities, which at the time
undertaken, were legal.”95 Thus, I think we can safely assume that the framers
intended to prohibit “retroactive oaths” by which they at least meant that
oaths, to be sworn, required you to promise not to have done something you
had already done.96 Beyond that, we don’t know what other sorts of
“retroactive oaths” concerned the framers and there has been no subsequent
interpretation by the Maryland appellate courts. We know even less about the
“retroactive . . . restriction[s]” that the framers prohibited. That phrase was
not discussed in the records of the constitutional convention, or in the
surrounding press accounts, nor has it been the subject of subsequent
appellate consideration.97 We just don’t know.
I think that we can reach a few conclusions, however, based on the
grammar, word placement, and word choice of the third clause. First, the
framers of this third clause separated it from the second clause with a

94. MD. CONST. Decl. of Rts., art. 17 (1867).
95. Friedman, Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra note 25, at 693 n.284; Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866) (finding Missouri’s iron-clad oaths to violate federal ex post
facto provision). But see JOHN J. CONNOLLY, REPUBLICAN PRESS AT A DEMOCRATIC
CONVENTION: REPORTS OF THE 1867 MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION BY THE
BALTIMORE AMERICAN AND COMMERCIAL ADVERTISER, 144 n.142 (2018) [hereinafter CONNOLLY,
REPUBLICAN PRESS] (pointing out that the “Republican press of the day, however, likely would not
have considered activities such as joining the Confederate States Army legal at the time they were
undertaken”). In any event, however, it was clear that after adoption of the Maryland Constitution
of 1867, it would have been unconstitutional to require anyone to take an “iron-clad” oath. Id. (citing
BALT. SUN, Oct. 15, 1867).
96. Just the year before, in 1866, the U.S. Supreme Court had found that enforcement of
Missouri’s iron-clad oaths violated the federal ex post facto provision. Cummings, 71 U.S. 277
(1866) (finding Missouri’s iron-clad oaths to violate federal ex post facto provision). I don’t know
whether the Maryland framers in 1867 were unaware of the recent decision in Cummings, felt it
insecure, or just wished to emphasize the contempt in which they held these iron-clad oaths and did
so by adopting a belt-and-suspenders protection in Article 17.
97. Although Doe also argued that the requirement of being on the sex offender registry was a
“retrospective . . . restriction” under the third clause of Article 17, none of the judicial opinions
reached the issue. Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 430 Md. 535, 543 n.7, 62 A.3d 123,
127 n.7 (2013) (quoting MD. CONST. Decl. of Rts., art. 17). Implicit in Doe’s argument was the
understanding that the third clause of Article 17 includes a separate prohibition on retrospective
restrictions. I think that, grammatically, this makes sense (and avoids the redundancy problem if we
were to believe that retrospective oaths are the same thing as retrospective restrictions), but I am
not sure precisely what “retrospective . . . restriction[s]” the framers were worried about. MD.
CONST. Decl. of Rts., art. 17.
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semicolon, presumably to give it equal weight with the second clause.98
Second, the framers also began the third clause with the word “nor,” which
is defined “as a function word to introduce the second or last member or the
second and each following member of a series of items each of which is
negated.”99 Retroactive oaths and restrictions are prohibited in the same
language and with the same force as ex post facto laws. Third, the second
clause is clearly directed at the General Assembly and prohibits it from
making ex post facto Laws. By contrast, the third clause is directed more
broadly, although its passive voice construction prevents us from determining
exactly which officials are covered. It certainly includes the elections
officials who had until recently enforced the iron-clad oaths;100 after adoption
of the third clause those elections officials—and likely everyone else in the
executive department—would be prohibited from “requir[ing]” retrospective
oaths. The more challenging question, turns on the other verb, “impos[ing].”
The iron-clad oaths were imposed, as described above, by the Constitution of
1864.101 If the third clause, by its literal terms, seeks to prohibit future
constitutional framers from imposing retrospective oaths or restrictions, I’m
not sure that it would be effective, because, as a formal matter, a state
constitution can’t restrict future state constitutional framers.102 Fourth and
finally, it seems clear to me that neither “retrospective oaths” nor
“retrospective . . . requirements” have anything to do with criminal law. The
iron-clad oaths, with which the third clause was most immediately concerned,
prevented those who couldn’t swear them from voting or holding office. 103
This necessarily means that the 1867 framers didn’t think that the mention of
criminal laws in the preamble prevented them from prohibiting “retrospective
oaths” and “retrospective . . . requirements” in non-criminal contexts in the
third clause. That is, the 1867 framers treated the phrase, “punishing acts
committed before the existence of such laws, and by them only declared to
be criminal” as it appears in the first clause/preamble, as a nonrestrictive

98. Another drafter might have written the phrase: “Wherefore, no ex post facto Law,
retrospective oath, or retrospective restriction ought to be made, imposed, or required,” but our
framers didn’t.
99. Nor, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 845 (11th ed. 2007).
100. FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 81, at 7 (discussing imposition of
iron-clad oaths); Myers, supra note 93.
101. MD. CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 7 (1864).
102. The future framers could both repeal Article 17, and adopt new retrospective oaths and
restrictions and, if the voters approved, that would be constitutional (so long as they didn’t violate
the federal Constitution). See generally John Dinan, The Unconstitutional Constitutional
Amendment Doctrine in the American States: State Court Review of State Constitutional
Amendments, 72 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 983, 1002–07 (2020) (discussing constitutional provisions
purporting to preclude future constitutional amendment).
103. MD. CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 7 (1864).
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appositive phrase, as an example of retrospective laws, not a limitation.104
Moreover, I believe that that view of the 1867 framers ought to be binding
on us. That is, because even if the framers in 1776 believed that they were
adopting a restrictive clause,105 their intentions were replaced by those of the
1867 framers, who clearly thought that it was a nonrestrictive clause when
they repealed and replaced the entire provision.106
In the end, it seems clear from the text and history that the prohibition
on “retrospective Laws” in Article 17 is not limited in its application to
“criminal-only” but envisions a “civil-and-criminal” application. Moreover,
the additional prohibitions, on “retrospective oath[s]” and
“retrospective . . . restriction[s]” must necessarily apply in a “civil-andcriminal” context.107
III. CRITICAL RACE THEORY
Although my prior work in this vein focused on six important theories
of constitutional interpretation, I do not intend to suggest that these are the
only interpretive theories or the only ones that might provide useful insight
into the understanding of state constitutions. One theory of interpretation,
about which I have not previously written, but which provides important

104. They did this despite the prevailing understanding, derived from Chase’s opinion in Calder
v. Bull, that the phrase ex post facto had a technical meaning limited to the criminal context only.
See supra Section I.B. The Maryland framers in 1867 might not have known about Calder v. Bull
or its “criminal-only” limitation, but if they did, they overcame that to apply the phrase in a “civiland-criminal” context.
105. See supra note 79.
106. It is critical to appreciate that after a constitutional convention, the people of Maryland are
asked to approve the whole constitution, not just the provisions that are changed. Friedman, Article
19, supra note 12, at 966 n.92 (discussing failure to explore effect of subsequent readoption of
Maryland constitutional provisions); see also Dan Friedman, Magnificent Failure Revisited:
Modern Maryland Constitutional Law from 1967 to 1998, 58 MD. L. REV. 528, 534 (1999)
[hereinafter Friedman, Magnificent Failure Revisited] (discussing significance and consequences of
an “all-or-nothing” vote on proposed new constitution). The significance for an originalist
interpretation ought to be profound. Theoretically, the relevant original public meaning of a
provision of the Maryland Constitution is always the 1867 re-adoption (or in the case of subsequent
amendments, later), never before. But that isn’t the way we usually conduct the inquiry. I think this
is roughly analogous to Professor Jamal Greene’s observation that mainstream originalism
regarding the federal Constitution generally fails to account for the intervening adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD.
L. REV. 978 (2012).
107. MD. CONST. Decl. of Rts., art. 17.
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insight into Article 17, is critical race theory.108 Arising in response to
ahistorical and inaccurate claims that “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind,”109
[Critical Race Theory’s] basic premises are that race and racism
are endemic to the American normative order and a pillar of
American institutional and community life. Further, it suggests that
law does not merely reflect and mediate pre-existing racialized
social conflicts and relations. Instead law, as part of the social
fabric and the larger hegemonic order, constitutes, constructs and
produces races and race relations in a way that supports white
supremacy. Critical Race Theory . . . “coheres in the drive to
excavate the relationship between the law, legal doctrine, ideology,
and [white] racial power and the motivation ‘not merely to
understand the vexed bond between law and racial power but to
change it.’”110
We are reminded by the critical race theorists that accommodating
slavery, promoting racism, and maintaining white supremacy, were
important and intentional features of the federal constitutional design and
have, in large measure, defined American constitutional history.111 Thus,

108. Critical race theory is not entirely like the other interpretive theories that I have discussed.
It is broader, in that it is not limited to constitutional interpretation, and it is narrower, because there
are likely constitutional provisions about which it can provide little interpretive help. The classic
taxonomy, BOBBITT, supra note 21, doesn’t mention critical race theory at all (although the blame
for that may be put on timing). The book from which Richard Boldt and I teach our seminar in
constitutional interpretation, MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, & THOMAS D. ROWE,
JR., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (3d ed. 2007), doesn’t place critical race theory in Part II, which
traces interpretive theories, but in Part III, which tracks, “Perspectives.” Id. at 21–23, 575–629. For
me, the taxonomy questions are secondary. What matters is that critical race theory can help develop
better understanding of a constitutional provision. See supra text accompanying notes 12–13. I have
placed the critical race theory section of this Article here because the story it tells is so closely
connected to the historical discussion that immediately precedes it.
109. E.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 730 n.14
(2007) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); see also Neil
Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991) (arguing that
federal Constitution is not, and was not intended to be, “color-blind”).
110. Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race Theory
and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. L. REV. 329, 333–34 (2006) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Cheryl
I. Harris, Critical Race Studies: An Introduction, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1215, 1218 (2002)); see also
KHIARA M. BRIDGES, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: A PRIMER 10–15 (2019) (identifying key
agreements among critical race theorists); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE
THEORY 3–4 (3d ed. 2017) (defining critical race theory); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT
WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3–7
(1993). See generally GERHARDT ET AL., supra note 108, at 575–629. In discussing critical race
theory, I am, of course, discussing critical race theory as that intellectual movement’s adherents
describe it, not as its opponents have chosen to misunderstand it. See infra note 128.
111. See generally, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword, Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (2019); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing
Significance of Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 325 (1992); Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN.
L. REV. 363 (1992); Derrick Bell, Reconstruction’s Racial Realities, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 261 (1992);
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critical race theory reminds us that slavery, racism, and white supremacy are
often relevant and explanatory as we seek to understand the federal
Constitution.
And, if that is true for the federal Constitution (and it is), it is doubly
true for the Maryland Constitution.112 Slavery, racism, and white supremacy
were important, if not central features of every Maryland constitutional
convention and every version of the Maryland Constitution produced. The
Maryland Constitution of 1776 was relatively silent on the subjects of slavery
and race relations, but incorporated existing provincial law, which allowed
for and facilitated slavery.113 The Declaration of Rights that the 1776
constitutional convention produced guaranteed due process and the right to a
remedy, but only for free (white) men.114 And, it specifically protected the
interests of Eastern Shore slaveowners by requiring a special two-thirds vote
in the legislature for any amendment to the Constitution regarding slavery.115
An 1837 amendment to the Constitution went even farther, by specifically
endorsing slavery and requiring a unanimous vote to abolish it.116 The

Gotanda, supra note 109; Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward A Black Legal Scholarship: Race and
Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 67–97.
112. For more on this, see John J. Connolly’s outstanding new monograph, John J. Connolly,
Racial Laws in Maryland (1776–1864) (and What They Mean for Me), BAR ASS’N OF BALT. CITY,
https://www.baltimorebar.org/UserFiles/files/Racial%20Laws%20in%20Maryland%20and%20W
hat%20They%20Mean%20for%20Me.pdf (last visited July 27, 2022) [hereinafter Connolly, Racial
Laws]; see also CONNOLLY, REPUBLICAN PRESS, supra note 95, at xiv–xxi.
113. Connolly, Racial Laws supra note 112, at 5; Stephan Stohler, Slavery and Just
Compensation in American Constitutionalism, 44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 102, 120 (2019) (discussing
ways in which Maryland’s 1776 Constitution favored and perpetuated slavery).
114. Friedman, Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra note 25, at 658, 660; see also Friedman,
Tracing the Lineage, supra note 38, at 1012 (discussing Maryland framers’ apparent decision not
to copy Virginia’s declaration, “[that] all men are born equally free” because of the threat that
language posed to slavery); id. at 1008 (discussing draft provision prohibiting importation of slaves
as intended to increase monetary value of enslaved persons to slaveowners); Friedman, Maryland
Declaration of Rights, supra note 25, at 672, 707 n.546 (same).
115. MD. CONST. art. LIX (1776) (“That this Form of Government, and the Declaration of
Rights, and no part thereof, shall be altered, changed, or abolished, unless a bill so to alter, change
or abolish the same shall pass the General Assembly, and be published at least three months before
a new election, and shall be confirmed by the General Assembly, after a new election of Delegates,
in the first session after such new election; provided that nothing in this form of government, which
relates to the [E]astern [S]hore particularly, shall at any time hereafter be altered, unless for the
alteration and confirmation thereof at least two-thirds of all the members of each branch of the
General Assembly shall concur.” (emphasis added)). The provision was framed in the type of “polite
euphemism” common at the time but that was well-understood to protect ownership of enslaved
persons.
116. 1836 Md. Laws, ch. 197, § 26 (“That the relation of master and slave, in this State, shall
not be abolished unless a bill so to abolish the same, shall be passed by a unanimous vote of the
members of each branch of the General Assembly, and shall be published at least three months
before a new election of delegates, and shall be confirmed by a unanimous vote of the members of
each branch of the General Assembly, at the next regular constitutional session after such new
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Maryland constitutional convention of 1850–1851 almost didn’t occur
because of slaveowners’ fears of the abolition of slavery. Only by limiting
the scope of the convention bill to prevent changes to the protections for the
institution of slavery, was a constitutional convention held at all.117
Moreover, the 1851 Constitution was explicit in protecting slavery: “The
[L]egislature shall not pass any law abolishing the relation of master or slave,
as it now exists in this State.”118 The 1864 constitutional convention was held
during the Civil War and the convention delegates were overwhelmingly
representatives of the Union Party.119 The Maryland Constitution of 1864
abolished slavery,120 emancipated the enslaved people, and prohibited the
State (although not the federal government) from compensating the
slaveowners for their lost human property.121 The 1867 Constitution could
not (as I have no doubt that many of the convention delegates would have
preferred) reestablish slavery because of the intervening adoption of the
Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but demanded compensation
from the federal government for the lost “property.”122 The convention
delegates, in vulgar, racist language also debated restricting the rights of the
newly freed, formerly enslaved people to vote, serve as witnesses, and
receive public education.123

election, nor then, without full compensation to the master for the property of which he shall be
thereby deprived.”). For context, see Stohler, supra note 113.
117. FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 81, at 4–5.
118. MD. CONST. art. III, § 43 (1851).
119. FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 81, at 7; Myers, supra note 91, at
35–39.
120. MD. CONST. Decl. of Rts., art. 24 (1864) (“That hereafter, in this State, there shall be neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except in punishment of crime, whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted: and all persons held to service or labor as slaves are hereby declared free.”); MD.
CONST. art. III, § 36 (1864) (“The General Assembly shall pass no law, nor make any appropriation
to compensate the masters or claimants of slaves emancipated from servitude by the adoption of
this Constitution.”); id. art. III, § 45 (regarding receipt of grants from the United States); see also
Friedman, Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra note 25, at 660.
121. FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 81, at 128 (discussing MD. CONST.
art. III, § 46).
122. MD. CONST. Decl. of Rts., art. 24 (1867) (“That slavery shall not be re-established in this
State, but having been abolished, under the policy and authority of the United States, compensation,
in consideration therefor, is due from the United States.”); see also Connolly, Racial Laws, supra
note 112, at 6; CONNOLLY, REPUBLICAN PRESS, supra note 95, at xv (describing this provision as
“both shameful and mendacious”); Friedman, Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra note 25, at
660, 698 n.373; FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 81, at 128 (discussing MD.
CONST. art. III, § 46 (1867)).
123. PHILIP B. PERLMAN, DEBATES OF THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1867 (1923), at 228, 230–39 (regarding voting); id. at 156–64, 167–70, 320–22, 324, 340–47, 433
(regarding serving as witnesses); id. at 198–203, 243–48, 251–57, 439 (regarding public education);
CONNOLLY, REPUBLICAN PRESS, supra note 95, at xiv–xxiv.
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This nearly unbroken history124 of Maryland constitutional concern for
preserving and protecting slavery, racism, and white supremacy, suggests
that the constitutional framers (particularly in 1867 but maybe also in 1776,
when they were drafting Article 17) might have intended it to protect against
more than just retroactive criminal penalties, but also to protect pre-existing
legal relationships, like slavery, from what they would have considered
retroactive legislative modification, that is, emancipation.125 That is, the
constitutional framers might well have intended Article 17 as a protection
against legislative emancipation.
I am not sure, however, what use critical race theory would make of that
insight.126 Would a critical race theorist seek to apply and effectuate a
slaveowner’s desire to maintain his pre-existing legal relationship with an
enslaved person? I don’t think so. Now that slavery is prohibited, would a
critical race theorist seek to apply and effectuate that slaveowner’s desires
with respect to other pre-existing legal relationships? Again, I don’t think so.
Why should a critical race theorist seek to vindicate the slaveowner’s desires?
But even if critical race theory doesn’t provide a complete answer to how we

124. As described above, the Constitution of 1864 provided only the briefest respite from the
overwhelming racism of Maryland constitutions from the founding. Remarkably, the last overt
vestiges—the last explicitly racist textual references—weren’t removed from the Maryland
Constitution until 1976. FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 81, at 257, 358
n.12 (discussing MD. CONST. art. XIII, § 1) (regarding the formation of new counties).
125. Professor Stohler makes a similar claim, arguing that the politics of emancipation informed
the debate about the adoption of “just compensation” provisions in various state constitutions.
Stohler, supra note 113.
126. Critical race theory does not typically generate proposed constitutional interpretations but
reminds us to be skeptical of even landmark civil rights victories if the remedies in those cases fail
to address systemic racism. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals
and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); DERRICK BELL,
FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL 15–31 (1992); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980); BRIDGES,
supra note 110, at 438–49 (discussing critiques of Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I), 347 U.S.
483 (1954)); Tifanei Ressl-Moyer, Pilar Gonzalez Morales, & Jaqueline Aranda Osorno, Movement
Lawyering During a Crisis: How the Legal System Exploits the Labor of Activists and Undermines
Movements, 24 CUNY L. REV. 91, 95–98 (2021) (“In the end, Brown, though lauded as remarkable
for its recognition of the need for equality in principle and practice, did not actually achieve equality,
desegregation, or a significant reduction in harm for Black communities.”).
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should interpret Article 17,127 it is a valuable tool and enriches our
understanding of this provision of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.128
IV. MORAL REASONING
Ronald Dworkin argues that we should use moral reasoning, constrained
by history and integrity, to interpret constitutions.129 He advocates a threestep process:
1. The interpreter must decide whether the provision either
(1) states an abstract moral principle or (2) is more specific and
does not involve a moral principle. If the provision is specific, it is
interpreted according to its terms. On the other hand, if the
provision states an abstract moral principle, the interpreter then
moves to step 2.130
2. The interpreter must determine what moral principle the framers
intended to enact by adopting the provision. Dworkin conducts this
inquiry “by constructing different elaborations of the [abstract
phrases the framers used,] each of which we can recognize as a
principle of political morality that might have won their respect,
and then by asking which of these it makes most sense to attribute
to them, given everything else we know.”131

127. I have generally adopted the distinction between foundationalist interpretive theories, by
which their adherents seek to provide answers to all interpretive questions with a single technique,
and non-foundationalist interpretive theories, by which adherents can interpret individual
constitutional provisions. See supra note 52 (discussing foundationalism); FARBER & SHERRY,
supra note 13, at 1 (noting that foundationalism “seeks to ground all of constitutional law on a single
foundation”). Here, by noting that critical race theory doesn’t provide a complete answer to every
interpretive question, I am merely acknowledging that it is a non-foundationalist form of
constitutional interpretation.
128. Recently, critical race theory has become a target for white supremacist state legislatures,
who seem unaware of what critical race theory is (it is not diversity and inclusion training, antiracism education, or intended to make white children feel badly about themselves), to whom it is
taught (it is not taught in primary or secondary schools), or that, by banning academic discussion of
critical race theory, these state legislatures are acting to uphold systemic racism precisely as critical
race theory predicts. See Khiara M. Bridges, Language on the Move: “Cancel Culture,” “Critical
Race Theory,” and the Digital Public Sphere, 131 YALE L.J.F. 767, 784–90 (2022); Khiara M.
Bridges, Commentary, Evaluating Pressures on Academic Freedom, 59 HOUS. L. REV. 803, 812–
17 (2022).
129. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 2–19 (1996); Friedman, Special Laws, supra note 12, at 444–48 (discussing
constitutional interpretation by moral reasoning).
130. DWORKIN, supra note 129, at 8.
131. Id. at 9.
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3. “The moral reading [then] asks [constitutional interpreters] to
find the best conception of constitutional moral principles . . . that
fits the broad story of America’s historical record.”132
Thus, the first question we must ask is whether nonretroactivity of
legislation is an abstract moral principle. Remarkably, we know precisely
what Dworkin thought of that claim. We know because Dworkin’s
contemporary, jurisprudence scholar, Lon Fuller, wrote a book in which he
identified eight principles of lawmaking that, according to Fuller, generate
an “internal morality of law.”133 Those eight principles are that law be
(1) general, (2) publicly promulgated, (3) clear, (4) non-contradictory, (5)
possible to comply with, (6) relatively constant through time, (7)
nonretroactiv[e], and (8) that there be congruence between official action and
declared rule.134 According to Fuller, irrespective of the substantive content
of the laws made, a lawmaking process that comports with these eight
principles “must necessarily contain some moral dimension.”135 Thus, we
know that Fuller believed that nonretroactivity is, in some sense, an abstract
moral principle. Finally, we also know that Fuller distinguished between
retroactive criminal laws, which he found always to be “objectionable,” and
retroactive civil laws, which he argued, could be acceptable in limited
situations.136 We know also, however, that Dworkin disagreed with Fuller. In
fact, Dworkin wrote a whole law review article explaining why, in his view,
Fuller’s eight principles are useful standards for lawmaking, but do not create
morality.137 Thus Dworkin—perhaps the chief exponent of the moral theory
of constitutional interpretation—would be unlikely to find that
nonretroactivity is an abstract moral principle. Presumably, then, Dworkin
would find Article 17 to be specific and simply apply it according to its terms.

132. Id. at 11. For more on moral theory (or as he calls it, ethical interpretation (in intentional
contradistinction to moral interpretation)), see BOBBITT, supra note 21, at 93–119, 123–77.
133. LON FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW 42–43 (1964); see also id. at 91.
134. Id. at 39 (describing “eight distinct routes to disaster”; that is, if a system of laws lacks these
characteristics it will “not properly [be] called a legal system at all”); id. at 41 (describing “eight
kinds of legal excellence toward which a system of rules may strive”); id. at 46–91 (explaining each
of the eight); see also Kristen Rundle, Fuller’s Internal Morality of Law, PHIL. COMPASS 499, 501
(2016); SEAN COYLE, MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 212–27 (2d. ed. 2017); GILLIAN MACNEIL,
LEGALITY MATTERS: CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND THE PROBLEMS AND PROMISE OF THE
PROHIBITION ON OTHER INHUMANE ACTS 16 (2021); Colleen Murphy, Lon Fuller and the Moral
Value of the Rule of Law, 24 LAW & PHIL. 239, 240–41 (2005).
135. See Rundle, supra note 134, at 501.
136. MACNEIL, supra note 134, at 19–20 (discussing FULLER, supra note 133, at 57–59, 93).
137. Ronald Dworkin, Philosophy, Morality, and Law—Observations Prompted by Professor
Fuller’s Novel Claim, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 668 (1965) (rejecting Fuller’s claim that his eight
principles of lawmaking were aspects of morality).
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Despite Dworkin’s view, however, I think a serious claim can be made
that retroactive laws are immoral.138 Even if we assume that retroactive laws
are immoral, however, an insurmountable difficulty remains at Dworkin’s
step 2, in selecting the moral principle that the framers intended from between
the two obvious choices: (1) Don’t pass retroactive laws; or (2) don’t pass
retroactive criminal laws. In my judgment, all else equal, a deprivation of
liberty is a greater deprivation than a deprivation of property.139 As a result,
in my view, retroactive laws that deprive people of their liberty are
necessarily worse—and necessarily less moral—than retroactive laws that
deprive people of their property. But even if that proposition is true and could
garner universal agreement, it does not help us determine the proper
interpretation of Article 17 under moral reasoning interpretive theory. The
constitutional framers could have wanted to prohibit only the greater moral
failure, retroactive deprivation of liberty. Or the constitutional framers could
have wanted to prohibit both the greater and lesser moral failures, both the
retroactive deprivation of liberty and the retroactive deprivation of property.
The historical record is unclear as to which of these elaborations would have
won the respect of the Maryland framers in 1776 (or the federal framers in
1787–89), but it is clear that by 1798, Chase unilaterally selected the second
elaboration in Calder v. Bull. Thus, it doesn’t seem that Dworkin’s
interpretive technique adds much to our understanding of Article 17.140
V. STRUCTURALISM
Structuralism suggests that, in addition to studying the text of a
constitutional provision, we should also reason from the structure and
relation created by the text.141
138. See, e.g., Bernard W. Bell, In Defense of Retroactive Laws, 78 TEX. L. REV. 235, 239 (1999)
(“Retroactive laws are immoral because they do not give citizens advance notice of their legal
obligations.”); DANIEL E. TROY, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION 1 (1998) (“A retroactive law is truly
a monstrosity.” (quoting FULLER, supra note 133, at 53)); id. at 17 (“Where no law is, there is no
transgression.” (quoting Romans 4:15)); id. at 26 (invoking Caligula and Blackstone); Jeffrey Omar
Usman, Constitutional Constraints on Retroactive Civil Legislation: The Hollow Promise of the
Federal Constitution and Unrealized Potential of State Constitutions, 14 NEV. L.J. 63, 63–65 (2013)
(citing children and child psychologists, dog trainers, philosophers, and law professors).
139. I say this despite Troy’s efforts to explain the immorality of retroactive deprivations of
property. See TROY, supra note 138, at 17–24.
140. Just because an interpretive theory doesn’t help in interpreting a specific provision doesn’t
mean we shouldn’t use it. In my view, we need to rehearse the use of all methods of interpretation
each time or leave ourselves vulnerable to charges of an outcome-determinative selection of
techniques.
141. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22
(1969); see also Friedman, Article 19, supra note 12, at 972–75; Friedman, Special Laws, supra
note 12, at 458–59 (applying structuralism to state constitutional interpretation); Jessica BulmanPozen & Miriam Seifter, The Democracy Principle in State Constitutions, 119 MICH. L. REV. 859,
868 (2021) (arguing that “plentiful text [of state constitutions] facilitates the ‘close and perpetual
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A. Penumbral Reasoning
Structural reasoning, as a theory of constitutional interpretation,
requires an interpreter to consider not just the text of the constitution, but to
reason from the structure and relation created by the text.142 A principal
technique of structuralism is so-called penumbral reasoning.143
It seems to me that a penumbral reasoning analysis of our constitutional
prohibitions on retroactive legislation might proceed in three steps. First, the
U.S. Constitution has four separate but related prohibitions on aspects of
retroactive legislation.144 Second, one could read those four prohibitions as
exemplars of a greater, all-encompassing, preexisting prohibition against

interworking between the textual and the relational and structural modes of reasoning’ that Charles
Black advocated but that is often difficult for the federal document” (citation omitted)); Rex
Armstrong, Justice Linde’s Structural Approach to Constitutional Construction, 10 OR. APP.
ALMANAC 3 (2020). For more on structural interpretation, see BOBBITT, supra note 21, at 74–92.
142. BLACK, JR., supra note 141, at 7, 22 (describing a “method of inference from the structures
and relationships created by the constitution in all its parts or in some principal part”); Friedman,
Special Laws, supra note 12, at 458–59.
143. Because of Justice William O. Douglas’ language (“[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees[,] that help give them life and
substance”) and the result in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (recognizing a
constitutional right to privacy), this is a controversial method of constitutional interpretation. See,
e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 95–100 (1990); David Luban, The Warren
Court and the Concept of a Right, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7 (1999) (critiquing Bork’s critique
of Griswold); see also Boldt, supra note 13, at 687–89 (explaining different visions of Griswold in
Bork and Luban). Despite this, however, it is a common interpretive technique that has been used
at least since McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 426 (1819) (holding that despite the
lack of an “express provision” prohibiting Maryland from taxing the Bank of the United States, it
cannot do so because of a “principle which so entirely pervades the [C]onstitution, is so intermixed
with the materials which compose it, so interwoven with its web, so blended with its texture, as to
be incapable of being separated from it, without rending it into shreds”); see also Stephen Macedo,
Morality and the Constitution: Toward a Synthesis for “Earthbound” Interpreters, 61 U. CIN. L.
REV. 29 (1992) (comparing reasoning in McCulloch and Griswold); and is used by judges from
across an ideological spectrum. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921, 935 (1997)
(relying on structural reasoning to hold that the Constitution prevents Congress from enlisting state
law enforcement to conduct background checks on handgun purchasers); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 827 (1995) (relying on structural reasoning to reject state imposition of
congressional term limits); see also Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Comfortably
Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1098–1100 (1997) (describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of
structural or “penumbral” reasoning in various cases); Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning
on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1333, 1334–37 (1992) (same).
144. The Takings Clause also acts as a limitation on a state’s power to undo pre-existing legal
relationships through retroactive legislation. TROY, supra note 37, at 66–72 (reviewing history);
Usman, supra note 138, at 74–76. Although it has become such a limitation, it clearly wasn’t at the
founding in 1789. Even after the federal Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791, its provisions didn’t
apply against the states, Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (declining to apply the
Takings Clause against the City of Baltimore), and didn’t become applicable against the states until
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, and incorporation by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Thus, we can’t consider
the Takings Clause as part of the federal founders’ design to prevent retroactive state legislation.
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retroactive legislation. And third, one could apply the same analysis to the
Maryland Declaration of Rights. I explain.
Depending how you count them, Article I, Section 10, clause 1 of the
U.S. Constitution prohibits States from doing nine things:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation;
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of
Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in
Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law,
or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of
Nobility.145
Four of these nine prohibitions are concerned with preventing state
legislatures from undermining pre-existing legal relationships. Those are:
1. “No State shall . . . make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a
Tender in Payment of Debts.” That is, if you loaned somebody
money backed by gold or silver, state legislatures cannot pass a law
requiring you to accept repayment in something other than gold or
silver. In this Article, I will refer to this clause as the Legal Tender
Clause.
2. “No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder.” A bill of
attainder is a legislative act criminalizing individual behavior. The
prohibition on bills of attainder prohibits state legislatures from
functioning as a judicial actor, punishing individual acts. Thus, the
prohibition on bills of attainder’s principal function is to enforce
the separation of powers. It also has an extra purpose of restraining
state legislatures from passing retroactive laws penalizing acts that
weren’t illegal when committed.146
145. Another way to count the prohibitions in Article I, § 10, cl. 1 is by using the semicolons. If
counted in this way, there are six prohibitions, no State shall (1) “enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation;” (2) “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal;” (3) “coin Money;” (4) “emit Bills of
Credit;” (5) “make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts;” and (6) “pass
any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any
Title of Nobility.” This counting method is suggested by Yellin, supra note 79, at 716, 732
(describing function of semicolons in the U.S. Constitution, including “separating the items in a list
where those items contain internal commas”).
146. Chase discusses this additional purpose of the bills of attainder provisions in Calder:
The prohibition against their making any ex post facto laws was introduced for greater
caution, and very probably arose from the knowledge, that the Parliament of Great
Britain claimed and exercised a power to pass such laws, under the denomination of bills
of attainder, or bills of pains and penalties; the first inflicting capital, and the other less,
punishment. These acts were legislative judgments; and an exercise of judicial power.
Sometimes they respected the crime, by declaring acts to be treason, which were not
treason, when committed, at other times, they violated the rules of evidence (to supply a
deficiency of legal proof) by admitting one witness, when the existing law required two;
by receiving evidence without oath; or the oath of the wife against the husband; or other
testimony, which the courts of justice would not admit; at other times they inflicted
punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment; and in other
cases, they inflicted greater punishment, than the law annexed to the offence. The ground
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3. “No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law.” The
prohibition on ex post facto laws prohibits state legislatures from
passing laws giving consequences to acts that when taken did not
have consequences (or had different consequences).
4. “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts.” The prohibition on laws impairing contracts
protects settled legal expectations. The Contracts Clause prohibits
state legislatures from changing the legal regime in such a way as
to impair existing contractual relationships.147

for the exercise of such legislative power was this, that the safety of the kingdom
depended on the death, or other punishment, of the offender: as if traitors, when
discovered, could be so formidable, or the government so insecure! With very few
exceptions, the advocates of such laws were stimulated by ambition, or personal
resentment, and vindictive malice. To prevent such, and similar, acts of violence and
injustice, I believe, the Federal and State Legislatures, were prohibited from passing any
bill of attainder; or any ex post facto law.
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 389 (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphasis added). In this passage,
Chase is discussing how bills of attainder were used to change the legal rules after the commission
of a crime. Additionally, it is funny how Chase—acting under the pretext of keeping ex post facto
laws separate from those that violate the Contracts Clause—cannot help himself from mixing up
bills of attainder with ex post facto laws.
For a student comment on using the federal bills of attainder provision to challenge sex
offender registries, see Joel A. Sherwin, Comment, Are Bills of Attainder the New Currency?
Challenging the Constitutionality of Sex Offender Regulations that Inflict Punishment Without the
“Safeguard of a Judicial Trial”, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1301 (2010).
For more on the federal bills of attainder prohibition as a restriction on retroactive
legislation, see Usman, supra note 138, at 68–70; 2 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER,
SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (7th ed. 2009) § 41:1, at 386
(“Retroactivity is not a definitional characteristic of bills of attainder, but they frequently are, in
fact, retroactive, and this feature is often emphasized in statements concerning their unfairness.”);
see also Aaron H. Caplan, Nonattainder as a Liberty Interest, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1203.
147. For more on the Contracts Clause as a restriction on retroactive legislation, see Usman,
supra note 138, at 70–73; Elmer W. Roller, The Impairment of Contract Obligations and Vested
Rights, 6 MARQ. L. REV. 129 (1922).
It appears that a prohibition on laws impairing contracts first appeared in the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787. The same prohibition was then incorporated in the U.S. Constitution in 1788.
Interestingly, despite the obvious similarities between the prohibitions on the U.S. Congress, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, and state legislatures, id. art. I, § 10, Congress is not prohibited from impairing
contracts. As Michael McConnell wrote, “[t]he omission of a contracts clause from section 9 is too
obvious to be anything but deliberate.” Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property
Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure,
76 CALIF. L. REV. 267, 269 (1988); see also LOGAN, EX POST FACTO, supra note 26, at 12-13. After
the passage of the Northwest Ordinance, prohibitions on the impairment of contracts became a
regular feature in state constitutions: South Carolina (1790), Art. IX, § 2; Pennsylvania (1790), Art.
IX, § 17; Kentucky (1792), Art. XII, § 18; Kentucky (1799), Art. X, § 18; Ohio (1802), Art. VIII, §
16; Louisiana (1812), Art. VI, § 20; Mississippi (1817), Art. I, § 19; Indiana (1819), Art. I, § 18;
Alabama (1819), Art. I, § 19, and so on. Author’s original research at John Joseph Wallis,
NBER/University
of
Maryland
State
Constitution
Project,
UNIV. OF MD.,
www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu (last visited July 29, 2022). Today, the constitutions of 39 states
contain prohibitions on the impairment of contracts. Brian A. Schar, Contracts Clause Law Under
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Courts and commentators often interpret these four provisions
separately, in a very clause-bound way,148 and rarely consider the relationship
amongst the four prohibitions.149 Chase’s interpretation in Calder v. Bull
interpreted the provisions as separate entities and, in fact, specifically
rejected an interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause because he thought that
it would overlap with the Contracts Clause.150 And, over time, the U.S.
Supreme Court has reduced the scope of each of these four.151 The result is
State Constitutions: A Model for Heightened Scrutiny, 1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 123, 129 (1997).
Maryland’s Constitution, however, does not include a prohibition on the impairment of contracts.
148. The derisive epithet, “clause-bound,” is taken from JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 12–13 (1980).
149. For example, every constitutional law casebook on my shelf treats these four provisions
separately. See, e.g., GREGORY E. MAGGS & PETER J. SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 508, 557 (2009) (discussing the prohibition on bills of attainder in a
chapter about separation of powers, while discussing the Contracts Clause in a chapter on protection
of economic liberty); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 491, 496, 645 (discussing the prohibition of
bills of attainder and the Ex Post Facto Clause in a chapter on the Constitution’s protection of civil
rights and civil liberties, while discussing the Contracts Clause in a chapter on economic liberties);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 587, 613, 632, 641 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing the Contracts Clause in one chapter and the Ex Post Facto Clause and prohibition on
bills of attainder in another). Other casebooks talk about the provisions together, but do not discuss
their focus on retroactivity. See, e.g., MICHAEL STOKES PAULSON, STEVEN G. CALABRESI,
MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, & SAMUEL L. BRAY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 283–
95 (2d ed. 2013) (describing these and other provisions as “ensur[ing] a kind of procedural
regularity”); RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES 538, 545
(9th ed. 2009) (discussing the Contracts Clause and the prohibition on bills of attainder in the same
chapter on due process); JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 217–
21 (7th ed. 2005) (discussing the Contracts Clause, Ex Post Facto Clause, and prohibition on bills
of attainder consecutively in a chapter on due process of law); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 209 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the Contracts
Clause, Ex Post Facto Clause, and prohibition on bills of attainder in the same chapter on
substantive due process); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison); Evan C. Zoldan, The
Permanent Seat of Government: An Unintended Consequence of Heightened Scrutiny Under the
Contract Clause, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEG. & PUB. POL’Y 163, 206–07 (2011) (reading the clauses together
as an individual protection against oppressive state legislation); Duane L. Ostler, Bills of Attainder
and the Formation of the American Takings Clause at the Founding of the Republic, 32 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 227, 246–48 (2010) (considering these provisions together as a form of protection of private
property). But see Zoldan, supra note 37, at 775–79 (making structuralist arguments in favor of
broad reading of ex post facto clauses as prohibition on retroactive legislation); Charles B.
Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 692 (1960); TROY, supra note 37.
150. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (“If the prohibition
against making ex post facto laws was intended to secure personal rights from being affected, or
injured, by such laws, and the prohibition is sufficiently extensive for that object, the other restraints,
I have enumerated, were unnecessary, and therefore improper; for both of them are retrospective.”).
Of course, by so doing, Chase made the Bill of Attainder Clause redundant to the Ex Post Facto
Clause.
151. Today, the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in these four areas is so constricted that it
is difficult for a state legislature to be found to have violated these provisions of the federal
Constitution. First, the Legal Tender Clause mostly has not been tested. Juilliard v. Greenman, 110
U.S. 421, 446 (1884) (creditor entitled to demand payment in gold or silver); see also Farmers &
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that most retroactive laws are constitutional under the U.S. Constitution. My
hypothesis here, however, is that rather than seeing these as four separate
clauses, they might be better understood as four examples of a more general
notion of prohibited retroactive legislation.152
This is the technique of interpretation by penumbral reasoning. Using
this method of interpretation, one might say that these four provisions were
the only examples known to the constitutional framers (or the four of which
they thought at the time), but together they indicate the framers’ inclination
to prohibit all kinds of retroactive legislation, including but not necessarily
limited to retroactive legislation ascribing guilt to specific individuals (bills
of attainder);153 retroactive legislation generally (ex post facto laws);
retroactively changing the rules agreed to by the parties to contracts
(Contracts Clause); and retroactively changing the currency in which a
creditor could receive payment of a debt (Legal Tender Clause).154
This is a difficult argument, and it is even harder to make with respect
to the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which in 1776 contained three
Merchs. Bank v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank, 262 U.S. 649, 659 (1923) (state law allowing creditor to choose
to accept alternative payment is constitutional). Second, courts have restricted the definition of what
constitutes a bill of attainder to legislation that satisfies three essential elements: It must (1) specify
affected persons, (2) inflict punishment, and (3) lack a judicial trial. See, e.g., Selective Serv. Sys.
v. Minn. Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984); see also TROY, supra note 37, at 56–58.
Third, if one believes that the original intention of the ex post facto provision was to prevent all
retroactive legislation, the decision in Calder to restrict its application to criminal laws only
constitutes a substantial constriction. TROY, supra note 37, at 47–53. And fourth, under current
Contracts Clause jurisprudence, even a substantial governmental interference with an existing
private contractual relationship will be upheld if it is reasonably related to achieving a significant
and legitimate public purpose. See, e.g., Energy Rsrvs. Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459
U.S. 400, 411–13 (1983). Only governmental interference with governmental contracts is subjected
to more searching review. U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977); TROY, supra note
37, at 60–62. The result is that there is no effective federal constitutional limitation on retroactive
legislation.
152. Selinger makes a similar point in a different way: He argues that the Ex Post Facto Clause
is a general prohibition on all retroactive legislation and that the Legal Tender Clause and the
Contracts Clause are specific examples of this general prohibition. Selinger, supra note 38, at 195.
153. But see Matthew Steilen, Bills of Attainder, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 767 (2016) (arguing that the
distinctive features of a bill of attainder is that it is a summary proceeding, not that it is conducted
by the legislature).
154. Professor Eugene McCarthy, in explaining the structuralist reasoning in Griswold, argues
that the constitutional framers intended but omitted the constitutional right to privacy, similar to the
way Ernest Hemingway wrote using the so-called iceberg theory of omission. Eugene McCarthy,
In Defense of Griswold v. Connecticut: Privacy, Originalism, and the Iceberg Theory of Omission,
54 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 335 (2018). I admire Professor McCarthy’s effort to use literary theory,
but very much doubt that conscientious and careful constitutional drafters (unlike conscientious and
capable literary authors) would intentionally leave out a concept that they wanted protected. Instead,
I think it is much more likely that our constitutional framers were fumbling toward the best possible
expression of ideas that they were just then developing. It is no slight to George Mason’s
draftsmanship in writing the Virginia Declaration of Rights, to note that the framers of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights took Mason’s language and improved on it. See Friedman, Tracing the
Lineage, supra note 38, at 946–47; Friedman, Who Was First?, supra note 60, at 484–85.
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provisions that restricted aspects of retroactive legislation: the predecessor to
Article 17 (ex post facto laws); the predecessor to Article 18 (bills of
attainder); and the predecessor to Article 24 (“Law of the Land” or “due
process”).155 Nonetheless, I think it is possible to argue from these three data
points that the Maryland framers were concerned about and wished to
prohibit the General Assembly from passing any sort of retroactive
legislation.156
B. Placement Within the Constitution
Another possible aspect of structuralist constitutional interpretation
concerns the relative placement of a provision within a constitution.157
Certainly it is relevant and helpful of interpretation to note that a provision
appears in the Maryland Declaration of Rights rather than in the Maryland
Constitution (or, as it was originally known, the Form of Government).158
Professor G. Alan Tarr, however, counsels against using this method of
interpretation for state constitutions: “State constitutional provisions should
generally be understood as discrete units, because state constitutions typically
lack a unifying theory or set of extraconstitutional assumptions.”159 Despite
that caution, I think it can be an important method of interpretation if used
with care.160
155. See generally Friedman, Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra note 25, at 656, 660.
Article 24 is one of the two sources identified for the state constitutional protection of vested rights.
The other is the eminent domain provision found in Article III, Section 40 of our current
constitution. Muskin v. State Dep’t of Assessments & Tax’n, 422 Md. 544, 30 A.3d 962 (2011);
Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md. Inc., 370 Md. 604, 805 A.2d 1061 (2002). That eminent domain
provision, however, was not part of our 1776 Maryland Constitution. See supra note 144.
156. I hasten to add that the penumbral reading is helpful but not necessary to my thesis. If I am
right that the original meaning of Article 17 was to prohibit all retroactive laws, then we don’t need
penumbras from a preexisting right against retroactive legislation to protect us.
157. Friedman, Special Laws, supra note 12, at 458–60.
158. See Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. State, 15 Md. 376, 459 (1860); Murphy v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 478 Md. 333, 383–84, 274 A.3d 412, 441–42 (2022).
159. G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 1169, 1170–71, 1194
(1992). Of course, if Professor Tarr is correct, that we must interpret constitutional provisions in
isolation, then it is unwise to use the method of penumbral reasoning described above in Section
V.A.
160. By this, I mean that it is easy to get carried away with placement-type arguments. While we
can track, for example, that various constitutional conventions moved some provisions earlier in the
declaration of rights, I don’t think we can place much, if any, interpretive weight on this reordering.
See, e.g., Friedman, Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra note 25, at 648, 651, 684 n.131, 687
n.174 (noting 1864 placement of “all men are equally free” provision as Article 1, “paramount
allegiance” to national government as Article 5); id. at 656–57, 694 nn.299–301 (discussing 1776
moving of Articles recognizing “sole and exclusive right” of “internal government” and right to
retain common law). On the other hand, the choice to put a provision in the Declaration of Rights
(as opposed to in the Constitution itself) must have some meaning. Friedman, Special Laws, supra
note 12, at 458–60 (considering significance of placement of special laws prohibition in legislative
article of the Constitution rather than in the Declaration of Rights); see also FRIEDMAN, THE MD.
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Using this technique, Justice Warren M. Silver of the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court has suggested that the juxtaposition of the placement of the
federal ex post facto provision in a section of the federal Constitution that
restricts state legislative power with the state constitutional placement in the
state declaration of rights, which enumerates personal rights, suggests that a
higher standard of judicial scrutiny is appropriate under the state constitution
than under the federal.161 Obviously, Article 17 is located in the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, not Article III of the Maryland Constitution,
suggesting, at least, that this is a personal right to be free from retroactive
legislation rather than a prohibition on the General Assembly’s otherwise
plenary power to pass legislation. While I think this observation is interesting
and useful, it doesn’t seem to advance our understanding of the scope of the
prohibition on retroactive laws and specifically whether it is a “criminalonly” or a “criminal-and-civil” right.
C. “Making Sense”—Avoiding Jurisprudential Incoherence
In Professor Black’s landmark book, Structure and Relationship in
Constitutional Law, he urged constitutional interpreters to find
interpretations that “make sense.”162 One aspect of finding constitutional
interpretations that “make sense,” in my view,163 is to avoid jurisprudential
incoherence by ensuring that similar provisions are treated similarly (and to
avoid situations where a plaintiff’s invocation of the wrong constitutional
provision precludes appropriate relief).164 The Court of Appeals’ decision in
Doe frames one of these situations nicely.
STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 81, at 32 (discussing moving what is now Article 23 of the
Declaration of Rights—jury as judges of law and fact—from Article XV of the Constitution);
Friedman, Magnificent Failure Revisited, supra note 106, at 546 n.95 (same).
161. State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 27–28 (Me. 2009) (Silver, J., concurring); see also Lauren
Wille, Note, Maine’s Sex Offender Registry and the Ex Post Facto Clause: An Examination of the
Law Court’s Unwillingness to Use Independent Constitutional Analysis in State v. Letalien, 63 ME.
L. REV. 367, 375–76 (2010). Maine’s Letalien decision is also discussed infra at notes 189, 192.
162. BLACK, JR., supra note 141, at 22.
163. Richard Boldt argues that this is not really a structuralist interpretation (although he is
willing, he says, to call it “meta-structuralism”). Richard knows more about Professor Black than I
do. See Boldt, supra note 13. He’s certainly right that I am pushing Professor Black’s desire for
interpretations that “make sense” beyond what Black, himself, intended. But Professor Black was
thinking about the relatively short and generally coherent U.S. Constitution. With respect to state
constitutions, however, written and adopted at many different times by many different framers, the
risk of jurisprudential incoherence is a serious problem, and the desire to find interpretations that
create jurisprudential coherence is, in my view, a worthwhile goal. Friedman, Special Laws, supra
note 12, at 458–59. And I think this interpretive goal fits best (although imperfectly) within the
rubric of structuralism.
164. Friedman, Special Laws, supra note 12, at 461–62 (arguing that applying different levels of
deference to democratically-selected policy choices under two similar state constitutional provisions
does not “make sense”); see also Friedman, Article 19, supra note 12, at 972–74 (arguing that state
constitutional interpretation that resurrected repudiated Lochner-style constitutional theory doesn’t
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Judge Greene’s plurality opinion in Doe makes clear that a law must be
a criminal law or sufficiently criminal law adjacent to receive protection
under Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Judge Greene was
explicit: “Article 17’s prohibition is not implicated in purely civil matters.”165
The various concurring and dissenting opinions take this dichotomy for
granted and disagree only about the appropriate standard for determining if a
law is sufficiently criminal law adjacent.166
In other cases, however, the Court of Appeals has been very clear that
retroactive civil laws are unconstitutional if they disturb settled, legally
enforceable expectations, that is, vested rights.167 For example, in Muskin v.
State Department of Assessments & Taxation,168 the Court of Appeals was
very protective of the vested property interests of ground rent owners against
retrospective registration and right of purchase legislation.169 The Court
specifically rejected applying any standard that took into consideration the
General Assembly’s purpose and adopted an absolute standard: Any
retroactive legislative interference with vested rights is unconstitutional.170
The Court of Appeals hasn’t been particularly clear in identifying the source
of that protection (sometimes locating it in the requirements for exercise of
eminent domain, Article III, Section 40), it is most often understood as
flowing from Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights: Our “Law of the Land”
provision (and due process analog).171
It is my view that the Doe plurality and the concurring and dissenting
opinions are wrong when they suggest that retrospective civil laws are

“make sense”); id. at 974–75 (arguing that state constitutional interpretation that places too much
interpretive weight on which plaintiff’s case arrives first at the appellate court doesn’t “make
sense”).
165. Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 430 Md. 535, 559, 62 A.3d 123, 137 (2013)
(citing Spielman v. State, 298 Md. 602, 609, 471 A.2d 730, 734 (1984)) (“[I]n Maryland, ‘the
prohibition of ex post facto laws applies only to criminal cases. There is no clause in the Maryland
Constitution prohibiting retrospective laws in civil cases.’” (quoting Braverman v. Bar Ass’n of
Balt., 209 Md. 328, 348, 121 A.2d 473, 483 (1956))).
166. See supra Part I.
167. See infra note 214.
168. 422 Md. 544, 30 A.3d 962 (2011).
169. Id. For other vested rights cases, see, for example, John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co. v.
Reliable Tractor, Inc., 406 Md. 139, 957 A.2d 595 (2008); Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md., Inc., 370
Md. 604, 630 n.9, 805 A.2d 1061, 1076 n.9 (2002); Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 754 A.2d 389
(2000).
170. Muskin, 422 Md. at 557, 30 A.3d at 969.
171. MD. CONST. Decl. of Rts., art. 24 (“That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or
disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed,
or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the
land.”). Selinger is particularly critical of using due process-type provisions—as Maryland’s Article
24 is usually considered—to enforce prohibitions on retroactive civil legislation. Selinger, supra
note 38, at 198–99 (discussing General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181 (1992)).
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constitutional. I think the criminal/civil dichotomy is unnecessary.172 Instead,
I would say that retroactive laws—either civil or criminal—that disturb
legally-enforceable rights are unconstitutional. Minor retroactive changes in
the criminal law (those that don’t operate to a defendant’s disadvantage) are
acceptable, but more major changes (those that operate to the defendant’s
disadvantage) are unconstitutional. Minor retroactive changes in the civil
laws (those that don’t operate to impair a vested right) are acceptable, but
more major changes (those that operate to impair a vested right) are
unconstitutional.173 This construct avoids a false dichotomy, more correctly

172. Selinger argues that often the difference between civil and criminal law is in the discretion
of the prosecutor. Selinger, supra note 38, at 198 (discussing discretion of federal Securities and
Exchange Commission to seek criminal or civil penalties).
173. I think this is generally correct but oversimplifies a complex area of Maryland law. The
common law rules governing retroactive civil legislation in Maryland are as follows (although I
organize these a little differently than the Court of Appeals does). I ask, first, whether the legislation
concerns substantive or procedural rights. Langston, 359 Md. at 406–07, 754 A.2d at 394–95
(explaining difference between legislation that effects substantive and procedural rights). If the
legislation concerns procedural rights (sometimes framed as remedies and evidence), then it is per
se constitutional. Moreover, if the legislation concerns procedure, absent an express contrary
intention, the legislation applies to all actions—accrued, pending, or future. Mason v. State, 309
Md. 215, 219–20, 522 A.2d 1344, 1345–46 (1987); Muskin, 422 Md. at 561, 30 A.3d at 971 (“We
have held consistently that the [General Assembly] has the power to alter the rules of evidence and
remedies . . . .”); see also Phillip Morris Inc. v. Glendening, 349 Md. 660, 668–69 n.6, 709 A.2d
1230, 1233–34 n.6 (1998) (describing the effect of retroactive procedural legislation on pending
litigation). If, on the other hand, the legislation purports to modify substantive rights, we proceed to
the next inquiry. Here, we ask about legislative intent. Est. of Zimmerman v. Blatter, 458 Md. 698,
728, 183 A.3d 223, 241 (2018) (describing importance of determining legislative intent). If the
legislature manifested an intent that the legislation should apply prospectively, the courts must
honor that intent. Doe v. Roe, 419 Md. 687, 20 A.3d 787 (2011). Moreover, if the legislature was
silent about whether it intended the legislation to operate prospectively or retroactively, courts apply
a strong presumption in favor of prospective application. State Ethics Comm’n v. Evans, 382 Md.
370, 387, 855 A.2d 364, 374 (2004); Langston, 359 Md. at 406, 754 A.2d at 394; see also Janda v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 237 Md. 161, 205 A.2d 228 (1964) (providing rules for discerning legislative
intent with respect to retroactivity). Only if the legislature has clearly expressed its intention that
legislation concerning substantive rights be applied retroactively, will courts find it to be so. Finally,
we come to the last question. Having thus far determined that the legislation concerns substantive
rights and is clearly intended to apply retroactively, we next ask whether it (1) impairs vested rights;
(2) denies the due process of law; or (3) creates an ex post facto law? Muskin, 422 Md. 544, 30 A.3d
962; Dua, 370 Md. 604, 805 A.2d 1061. If the answer to any of these three questions is yes, the
legislation is unconstitutional. Muskin, 422 Md. 544, 30 A.3d 962; Dua, 370 Md. 604, 805 A.2d
1061. If the answer to all three questions is no, then the legislation is constitutional and will be
applied as written. Muskin, 422 Md. 544, 30 A.3d 962; Dua, 370 Md. 604, 805 A.2d 1061. There is
also a bizarre, upside-down exception to these retroactivity rules that applies only in zoning and
land use cases. Yorkdale Corp. v. Powell, 237 Md. 121, 205 A.2d 269 (1964). In zoning and land
use cases only, if legislation makes a substantive change in the law, the courts apply a presumption
in favor of retroactivity and will apply the new law unless by so doing a vested right is impaired.
By contrast, if the legislation concerns a procedural right, it will only apply prospectively. STANLEY
D. ABRAMS, GUIDE TO MARYLAND ZONING DECISIONS § 3.06, at 3–59 (5th ed. 2021). While cases
have questioned the validity of this odd doctrine, Layton v. Howard Cnty. Bd. of Appeals, 399 Md.
36, 71–72, 922 A.2d 576, 597 (2007) (Wilner, J., dissenting), and narrowly cabined its application,
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reflects the reality of our constitutional protections, and “makes sense.”
Importantly, this does not require a different constitutional interpretation.
Instead, it only requires a different way of talking about the existing
constitutional interpretation. That is, rather than identifying Article 24 (and
Article III, Section 40) as the sources of the prohibition on retroactive civil
legislation that impairs vested rights, we should identify the source as being
Article 17, the ex post facto article.
VI. COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Comparative constitutional law can be an important tool in
constitutional interpretation.174 A constitutional interpreter should use a
three-part test to determine the weight to ascribe to a foreign precedent: “(1)
the extent to which the issue presented in [the foreign court’s] case parallels
the question [being considered]; (2) the similarities and differences between
the relevant provisions of the two constitutions and the systems that they
create; and (3) the persuasiveness of the arguments made by the foreign
court.”175 Here, there are useful comparisons to be made to the analyses of
other jurisdictions’ interpretations of their prohibitions on retroactive laws.
In the following subsections, I will use comparative constitutional law to
compare the interpretation of retroactive use of sex offender registries in the
federal courts and sister state courts; the interpretation of other state
constitutions prohibitions on retroactive civil laws; and international
prohibitions on retroactive legislation.
A. Federal and Sister State Decisions Regarding Retroactive
Application of Sex Offender Registries
I begin with the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower federal courts’
interpretation of the federal ex post facto provision. It may seem odd to
consider the federal constitutional provision as comparative constitutional
law, but although states must apply the federal standard as a minimum, that

McHale v. DCW Dutchship Island, LLC, 415 Md. 145, 999 A.2d 969 (2010), it remains firmly
intact. Layton, 399 Md. at 51–70, 922 A.2d at 584–96 (“[W]e reaffirm the Yorkdale rule . . . .”).
174. Friedman, Special Laws, supra note 12, at 417, 448–50; see also Friedman, Article 19,
supra note 12, at 978; Bruce D. Black & Kara L. Kapp, State Constitutional Law as a Basis for
Federal Constitutional Interpretation: The Lessons of the Second Amendment, 46 N.M. L. REV. 240
(2016) (advocating use of comparative constitutional law to inform interpretation of federal
constitutional provision); see also Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional
Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 349–52 (2011) (discussing comparative constitutionalism).
175. Friedman, Special Laws, supra note 12, at 417 n.29, 449–50 (footnote omitted) (relying on
Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, The Law of Nations, and Citations of Foreign Law: The
Lessons of History, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1335, 1360–62 (2007)).
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federal standard is just a persuasive authority as to how to interpret the state’s
constitutional provision.176
In Kansas v. Hendricks177 and, most importantly, in Smith v. Doe,178 the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld retroactive application of state sex offender
statutes against challenges under the federal Constitution’s prohibition on
states passing ex post facto laws.179 In Hendricks, the Court permitted the
retroactive application of a law allowing certain sex offenders to be civilly
committed after they served their prison sentences.180 In Smith, the Court
permitted the retroactive extension of the time that certain sex offenders were
required to register on Alaska’s sex offender registry.181 In both cases, the
U.S. Supreme Court majority applied the “intent-effects” test182 and held that
the laws were civil, nonpunitive regulatory measures and thus were not
within the ambit of the prohibition against ex post facto laws.183 The U.S.
Supreme Court has not considered the topic again since.
Since 2003, the majority of state and federal courts have followed Smith
and found that the registration schemes are constitutional.184 These courts
have continued to follow Smith despite: (1) the increasingly rigorous (or
punitive) sex offender registration schemes adopted by the states;185 (2) the
176. I confine my discussion here to the constitutionality of retroactive application of sex
offender registry laws and do not discuss retroactive laws more generally.
177. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
178. 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
179. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10.
180. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 351–53.
181. Smith, 538 U.S. 84; Corey Rayburn Yung, One of These Laws is Not Like the Others: Why
the Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional Questions,
46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 373–77 (2009).
182. In applying the “intent-effects” test, the U.S. Supreme Court directed courts to apply the
Mendoza-Martinez factors to determine if a law was punitive. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (citing Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963)).
183. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371; Smith, 538 U.S. at 105–06. For an analysis of these cases, see
LOGAN, EX POST FACTO, supra note 26, at 119-35.
184. See, e.g., Shaw v. Patton, 823 F.3d 556 (10th Cir. 2016); United States v. Parks, 698 F.3d
1 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Ryan W. Porte,
Sex Offender Regulations and the Rule of Law: When Civil Regulatory Schemes Circumvent the
Constitution, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 715, 733 n.142 (2018) (and cases cited therein); Yung,
supra note 181, at 370–71 nn.15–20 (and cases cited therein). This is an example of the shadow cast
over state constitutional practice by the U.S. Supreme Court as described by Robert F. Williams.
Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme
Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353 (1984).
185. It is beyond the scope of this Article to trace the history and increasing rigor of sex offender
registration requirements. See, e.g., Porte, supra note 184; Catherine L. Carpenter, A Sign of Hope:
Shifting Attitudes on Sex Offense Registration Laws, 47 S.W. L. REV. 1 (2017). My complaint
here—and the only concern of the ex post facto provision—is not with the rigor of sex offender
registration requirements but with their retroactive application. Suffice it to say that the federal
Congress first established national standards for sex offender registration in 1994, and significantly
strengthened those standards in 2006. Although the federal law itself does not require states to adopt
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possibility of independent interpretation of state constitutional protections
against retroactive legislation; and (3) social science research refuting prior
assumptions of sex offenders’ high risk of recidivism and insusceptibility to
treatment.186
Despite that strong trend of following Smith, there have been state and
federal courts that have found retroactive sex offender registration laws to
violate either a state or the federal constitution or both. For example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found by the clearest
proof that Michigan’s sex offender registry was a punishment and therefore
that its retroactive application violated the federal Ex Post Facto Blause.187
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that Pennsylvania’s sex
offender registry violated the federal Ex Post Facto Clause when applied
retroactively.188 The Maine Supreme Court found that the retroactive
application of the Maine sex offender registry violated the federal
Constitution.189 In addition to Maryland, state supreme courts in Alaska,190

retroactive registration requirements, it delegates rulemaking authority to the U.S. Attorney
General, who has adopted rules requiring states to adopt increasingly onerous and retroactive
registration schemes or risk losing access to federal grant funding. Porte, supra note 184, at 718–
26; Yung, supra note 181; Gilbert, supra note 11, at 167–69 (describing efforts to implement federal
regulations in Maryland). Many states, including Maryland, have complied and are certified by the
DOJ as having substantially implemented the federal registration requirements. The DOJ keeps a
scoreboard of those states, territories, and other jurisdictions that have attained “substantial
compliance” at SORNA Implementation Status, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF SEX OFFENDER
SENT’G, MONITORING, APPREHENDING, REGISTERING & TRACKING (SMART),
https://smart.ojp.gov/sorna/sorna-implementation-status (last visited Aug. 16, 2022).
186. Of course, post-enactment developments in social science have a limited role in
constitutional adjudication. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180 (1997);
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (1994); William E. Lee, Manipulating Legislative
Facts: The Supreme Court and the First Amendment, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1261 (1998). But see Does
Nos. 1–5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 704–05 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing “troubling” social science evidence
that sex offender registration statutes like Michigan’s may actually increase recidivism).
187. Does Nos. 1–5, 834 F.3d 696. The Michigan Supreme Court also independently concluded
that the Michigan sex offender registry violates the federal ex post facto provision. People v. Betts,
968 N.W.2d 497, 515 (Mich. 2021). In that same opinion, the Michigan Supreme Court also held
that the Michigan statute violated the state constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws. Id.; see
infra note 193; Alexander William Furtaw, Note, Sex Offender Legislation Ex Post Facto: The
History and Constitutionality of Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act, 48 J. LEGIS. 301
(2021).
188. Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1218 (Pa. 2017). In the same opinion, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court also found that the retroactive application of the sex offender registry
violated the ex post facto provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 1218–23; see infra note
197.
189. State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 14 (Me. 2009). In the same opinion, the Maine Supreme Court
also found that the retroactive application of the sex offender registry violated the Maine State
Constitution. Id.; see infra note 192.
190. Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1007–19 (Alaska 2008) (applying intent-effects test to find that
the retroactive application of the sex offender registry violated Article I, Section 15 of the Alaska
Constitution).
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Indiana,191 Maine,192 Michigan,193 New Hampshire,194 Ohio,195 Oklahoma,196
and Pennsylvania197 have all found that the retroactive application of their
state’s sex offender registry violated their state constitutional prohibition on
ex post facto laws or retroactive legislation.198
Having reviewed these decisions of state and federal courts, I can make
two observations. First, it is amazing to observe the outsize shadow that the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Doe has cast.199 Many state and

191. Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 379–84 (Ind. 2009) (applying intent-effects test to find
that the retroactive application of the sex offender registry violated Article I, Section 24 of the
Indiana Constitution).
192. Letalien, 985 A.2d at 14, 26 (Me. 2009) (applying intent-effects test to find that the
retroactive application of the sex offender registry violated Article I, Section 11 of the Maine
Constitution).
193. People v. Betts, 968 N.W.2d 497, 508–15 (Mich. 2021) (applying intent-effects test to
determine that retroactive application of sex offender registration law violates Article I, Section 10
of the Michigan Constitution); see supra note 187.
194. Doe v. State, 111 A.3d 1077, 1089–1104 (N.H. 2015) (applying intent-effects test to find
that the retroactive application of the sex offender registry violated Part I, Article 23 of the New
Hampshire Constitution).
195. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1110–13 (Ohio 2011) (finding that the retroactive
application of the sex offender registry violated Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution,
which prohibits both retroactive civil and criminal laws).
196. Starkey v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004, 1017–30 (Okla. 2013) (applying intenteffects test to find that the retroactive application of the sex offender registry violated Article II,
Section 15 of the Oklahoma Constitution); Alex Duncan, Note, Calling a Spade a Spade:
Understanding Sex Offender Registration as Punishment and Implications Post-Starkey, 67 OKLA.
L. REV. 323 (2015).
197. Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1218–23 (Pa. 2017) (finding retroactive
application of sex offender registry violated Article I, Section 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
particularly because of its special focus on reputational harms).
198. After some back-and-forth, it is now settled that the retroactive application of the Missouri
sex offender registry does not offend the Missouri Constitution. Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833
(Mo. 2006) (holding that retroactive application of sex offender registry is unconstitutional); Doe
v. Keathley, No. ED 90404, 2009 WL 21097, at *3–*4 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2009) (holding that
Phillips is moot due to requirements of a federal sex offender registration statute), aff’d on transfer,
290 S.W.3d 719, 720 (Mo. 2009); see also Sarah E. Ross, Recent Development, Retrospective
Laws—Do New Statutory Obligations on Sex Offenders Violate the Missouri Constitutional
Principle Forbidding Retrospective Laws? F.R. v. St. Charles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 301 S.W.3d 56
(Mo. 2010)., 42 RUTGERS L.J. 1093 (2011). Similarly, it now seems settled that the retroactive
application of the Kansas sex offender registry does not offend the Kansas Constitution. Doe v.
Thompson, 373 P.3d 750, 771 (Kan. 2016) (holding that sex offender registration system is
punitive); State v. Buser, 371 P.3d 886 (Kan. 2016) (same); State v. Redmond, 371 P.3d 900 (Kan.
2016) (same). But see State v. Petersen-Beard, 377 P.3d 1127, 1141 (Kan. 2016) (sex offender
registration system does not violate state ex post facto clause); Porte, supra note 184, at 733–34 (“In
one confusing day in 2016, two contradicting opinions came out of the Supreme Court of Kansas.
Doe v. Thompson held that the Kansas sex registration statute was punishment, and thus, violated
the ex post facto clause, while State v. Petersen-Beard overruled the first case, holding the
opposite.”).
199. The metaphor of shadows cast by Supreme Court precedents is from Robert F. Williams,
supra note 184.
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federal courts dutifully followed Smith, even when the statute being
evaluated was considerably different (and increasingly, more onerous) than
that early Alaska sex offender registry, and even when interpreting a different
constitutional provision (with different text, history, and possible scope).
Second, none of the states that found that its state constitution prohibited the
retroactive application of the sex offender registry questioned the classic
criminal/civil distinction from Calder v. Bull,200 and only Maryland declined
to adopt the U.S. Supreme Court’s “intent-effects” test.201 Despite this,
however, these courts each came to a different conclusion than did the U.S.
Supreme Court in Smith.202

200. A particularly perceptive critique of the fleeting and increasingly difficult to police line
between criminal and civil legislation across many different areas of the law is offered in Carol S.
Steiker, Foreword, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775 (1997).
201. Professor Wayne A. Logan proposes an alternative test to determine the constitutionality of
these sex offender registries. LOGAN, EX POST FACTO, supra note 26, at 137–44.
202. For a summary of state court treatment of sex offender registries, see LOGAN, EX POST
FACTO, supra note 26, at 135–37.
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B. Sister State Constitutional Prohibitions on Retroactive Civil Laws
There are eight states that have specific constitutional prohibitions on
retroactive civil legislation: Colorado,203 Georgia,204 Idaho,205 Missouri,206

203. “No ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its
operation, or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges, franchises or immunities, shall be
passed by the general assembly.” COLO. CONST. art. II, § 11; Ficarra v. Dep’t of Regul. Agencies,
Div. of Ins., 849 P.2d 6, 15 (Colo. 1993) (“It is well settled that an act is deemed to be violative of
[Article II, Section 11 of the Colorado Constitution] if it ‘takes away or impairs vested rights
acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new
disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.’” (quoting P-W Invs., Inc. v.
City of Westminster, 655 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Colo. 1982))); Grant T. Sullivan & Patrick R. Thiessen,
The Dewitt Test: Determining the Retroactivity of New Civil Legislation in Colorado, 40 COLO.
LAW., July 2011, at 73.
204. “No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or laws impairing the obligation of
contract or making irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities shall be passed.” GEORGIA
CONST. art. I, § 1, para. X; Deal v. Coleman, 751 S.E.2d 337, 343 (Ga. 2013) (“Even when the
General Assembly clearly provides that a law is to be applied retroactively, our Constitution forbids
statutes that apply retroactively so as to ‘injuriously affect the vested rights of citizens.’” (quoting
Bullard v. Holman, 193 S.E. 586, 588 (Ga. 1937))).
205. “No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall
ever be passed.” IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 16. “The legislature shall pass no law for the benefit of a
railroad, or other corporation, or any individual, or association of individuals retroactive in its
operation, or which imposes on the people of any county or municipal subdivision of the state, a
new liability in respect to transactions or considerations already past.” Id. art. XI, § 12. Coburn v.
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 387 P.2d 598, 601 (Idaho 1963) (holding that because “the enactment
constitutes substantive law, we cannot accord unto it a retroactive effect”); Rogers v. Hawley, 115
P. 687, 691 (Idaho 1911) (holding retroactive legislation was “in furtherance purely of the state’s
proprietary interests,” and thus did not violate the state constitution’s prohibition on retroactive
legislation “for the benefit of any railroad or any other corporation, or any individual, or association
of individuals”).
206. “That no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective
in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, can be
enacted.” MO. CONST. art. I, § 13; State v. Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d 410, 419 (Mo. 2013) (holding
that Missouri’s State Constitution prohibits retrospective civil laws that affect “vested right[s]”). In
determining that the prohibition on retrospective laws applied to civil laws only, the Honeycutt
Court found persuasive that the Missouri constitutional framers understood, based on Calder v. Bull,
that the ex post facto provision was criminal only.
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New Hampshire,207 Ohio,208 Tennessee,209 and Texas.210 The judicial
interpretation given to these provisions in each of the eight states requires the
courts to invalidate any law that retroactively invalidates an existing vested
right.211 Moreover, the other 42 states, lacking a clear, express constitutional
prohibition on retroactive civil laws, nonetheless require the courts to
invalidate any law that retroactively invalidates an existing vested right.212
Those states simply base that requirement on another provision of the state
constitution.213 Although the definition of a “vested right” is notoriously
slippery214 and may result in different outcomes from state to state and from
207. “Retrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive, and unjust. No such laws, therefore,
should be made, either for the decision of civil causes, or the punishment of offenses.” N.H. CONST.
pt. I, art. 23; In re Goldman, 868 A.2d 278, 281 (N.H. 2005) (“[Since] 1826, we [have] interpreted
Article 23 to mean that ‘every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights, acquired under
existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in
respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective.’” (quoting
Burrage v. N.H. Police Standards Council, 506 A.2d 342, 344 (N.H. 1986))).
208. “The general assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws, or laws impairing the
obligation of contracts . . . .” OHIO CONST. art. II, § 28; State v. Walls, 775 N.E.2d 829, 835 (Ohio
2002) (“It is now settled in Ohio that a statute runs afoul of this provision if it ‘takes away or impairs
vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or
attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.’” (quoting Van
Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 522 N.E.2d 489, 496 (Ohio 1988))).
209. “That no retrospective law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts, shall be made.”
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 20; Todd v. Shelby Cnty., 407 S.W.3d 212, 221 (Tenn. 2012) (holding that
the Tennessee Constitution “has uniformly been interpreted to mean that the Legislature may enact
laws that have a retrospective application only so long as they do not impair the obligations on
contracts or impair vested rights. However, statutes that are considered to be procedural or remedial
in nature may generally be applied retrospectively to cases pending at the time of their effective
date” (citations omitted)).
210. “No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or any law impairing the obligation
of contracts, shall be made.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16; Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground Water
Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 633 (Tex. 1996) (“Under our state charter, retroactive laws
affecting vested rights that are legally recognized or secured are invalid.”); Hyeongjoon David Choi,
Note, Robinson v. Crown: Formulation of a New Test for Unconstitutional Retroactivity or Mere
Restatement of Century-Old Texas Precedents?, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 309 (2012).
211. See supra notes 203–210.
212. 2 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 146 § 41:3; Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested
Rights, 5 TEX. L. REV. 231 (1927).
213. 2 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 146 § 41:3; Smith, supra note 212 (identifying
extraconstitutional and constitutional bases for invalidating retroactive laws that invalidate vested
rights, including the nature of republican government; the inherent limits on the powers of the state
legislature; the separation of powers; state due process provisions and others).
214. 2 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 146 § 41:6, at 455 (“Most attempts to define [vested rights]
are circuitous, as in the pronouncement that ‘a vested right, as that term is used in relation to
constitutional guarantees, implies an interest which it is proper for the state to recognize and protect,
and of which the individual may not be deprived arbitrarily without injustice.’”); James A. Kainen,
The Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional Protection for Property and Contract Rights,
79 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 120 (1993); Adam J. MacLeod, Of Brutal Murder and Transcendental
Sovereignty: The Meaning of Vested Private Rights, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 253 (2018);
Smith, supra note 212, at 231 (stating that defining a vested right is “impossible”); id. at 237–38
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time to time, there is a remarkable uniformity among the states in the
prohibition.
Maryland, once it had determined that Article 17 was “criminal-only,”
lacked a clear, express constitutional prohibition on retroactive civil laws.
Despite this, Maryland’s courts will nonetheless invalidate any retroactive
law that impairs a vested right based on the interpretation of other
constitutional provisions, namely Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights (the
“Law of the Land” provision) and Article III, Section 40 of the Maryland
Constitution (the condemnation/eminent domain provision).215 My
observation here is that the example of our sister states suggests that, like
Maryland, irrespective of whether a state constitution contains an express
prohibition on retrospective civil laws, courts will enforce the constitution as
if there is one. The result is that, to me, it does not seem to matter much if a
state constitution’s ex post facto provision is interpreted, following Calder v.
Bull, as being “criminal-only” or “criminal-and-civil” because the state
constitution will be read, as a whole, as prohibiting retroactive criminal and
civil laws.
C. International Prohibitions on Retroactive Laws
In international law, the prohibition on retroactive criminal legislation
is explicitly recognized in fundamental documents and is “one of ‘the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations.’”216 By contrast, there is no

(showing pairs of cases in which courts have come to opposite result about whether the right was
“vested” and whether it could be changed by retroactive legislation); Comment, The Variable
Quality of a Vested Right, 34 YALE L.J. 303, 309 (1925) (“[T]he chameleon character of the
term . . . ‘vested right’ . . . is not an absolute standard, but a variant which each [person],
lay[person], legislator, and judge, determines individually out of [their] own background.”).
215. Muskin v. State Dep’t of Assessments & Tax’n, 422 Md. 544, 30 A.3d 962 (2011) (relying
on Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights and Article III, Section 40 of the Maryland Constitution);
Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md. Inc., 370 Md. 604, 805 A.2d 1061 (2002) (same). See supra notes
169–171.
216. Yarik Kryvoi & Shaun Matos, Non-Retroactivity as a General Principle of Law, 17
UTRECHT L. REV. 46, 47 (2021) (quoting Int’l L. Comm’n, Second Rep. on General Principles of
Law, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/741, at 53–54 (Apr. 9, 2020)); MACNEIL, supra note 134, at 4 (arguing that
“a fair legal system does not need to absolutely prohibit the retroactive creation and application of
criminal law”); Suri Ratnapala, Reason and Reach of the Objection to Ex Post Facto Law, 1 INDIAN
J. CONST. L. 140, 141 (2006) (“The narrowness of [these] prohibition[s] allows legislatures to inflict
pain for innocent acts in the guise of civil liability. . . . [T]he U[nited] S[tates] being a notable
exception.”); UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS,
Art. 15(1) (1966) (“No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time
when it was committed.”); EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Art. 7(1) (1950) (“No one
shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was
committed.”); see also HUMAN RIGHTS ACT (U.K.) (1998); CONST. OF INDIA, Part III, Art. 20(1)
(2020); NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT (1990), § 26(1); CHARTER OF RIGHTS & FREEDOMS
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general principle of international law that prohibits retroactive application of
civil law.217 I suspect that the reason for this dichotomy is significantly
related to the adoption of these fundamental documents of human rights in
the post-World War II period and soon after the most famous prosecution
arguably in violation of this principle in history: the trials of Nazi war
criminals in Nuremberg.218 In any event, however, the judgment of
international law—that a prohibition on retroactive criminal laws is a general
principle of law recognized by all civilized nations, while a prohibition on
retroactive civil laws is not—runs significantly counter to much of the other
evidence that I have reported here. Oh well.
CONCLUSION
The process of constitutional interpretation that I have proposed—using
all available tools even when those tools might, individually, point in
different directions, to determine the best possible interpretation219—is
worthwhile, even when it does not always change the outcome. Here, we have
seen that textualism provides inconclusive results, turning at least in part, on
whether or not we read the reference to criminal laws as part of a
nonrestrictive appositive phrase. Originalism too, provides us with
inconclusive results, at least until the readoption of the provision, with
amendments, as part of the 1867 Maryland Constitution. Critical race theory
provides us with meaningful—but perhaps not actionable—insights into the
meaning of the provision. Moral reasoning theory, given the specific textual
command of the ex post facto provision, cannot provide us with useful
direction. I think structuralism’s command, that constitutional interpretations
“make sense,” compels us to harmonize our views on retrospective criminal
and civil legislation under Articles 17 and 24, respectively of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights. And comparative constitutional law provides us with
a series of comparisons that may—or may not—inform our analysis. All of
these methods help deepen our understanding of Article 17.
In the end, I think Judge Greene’s plurality opinion and Judge
McDonald’s concurrence in Doe v. DPSCS each used forms of common law
constitutional interpretation to come to the correct answers when they found
OF CANADA (Canadian Charter), § 11(g) (1982); GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany), Art. 103(2) (1949). See also
LOGAN, EX POST FACTO, supra note 26, at 171–90 (discussing international application of ex post

facto principles).
217. Kryvoi & Matos, supra note 216, at 57–58.
218. James Popple, The Right to Protection from Retroactive Criminal Law, 13 CRIM. L.J. 251
(1989) (discussing three examples of retroactive prosecutions: the Nazi war crime trials in
Nuremburg (1945–1947); Shaw v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions [1961] 2 WLR 897 (HL); and the socalled “bottom of the [Sydney, Australia] harbour” tax cases (1982)).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 12–13.
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that the retroactive application of the Maryland sex offender registry was
unconstitutional.220 Using our newfound knowledge, however, I would say
further that Article 17 generally prohibits all retroactive legislation. All
retroactive criminal laws are unconstitutional. Most retroactive civil laws are
unconstitutional too, unless they involve procedural or de minimis, unvested
substantive rights.221 Thus, it is possible that the only actionable insight in
this Article is to correct the statement from Braverman v. Bar Ass’n of
Baltimore,222 cited in Doe, that “[t]here is no clause in the Maryland
Constitution prohibiting retrospective laws in civil cases.”223 There is.224 The
question is only whether it is the ex post facto provision of Article 17, as I
believe, or it is the less explicit, “Law of the Land” provision of Article 24
and the eminent domain provision of Article III, Section 40.

220. Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 430 Md. 535, 62 A.3d 123 (2013).
221. I would also allow retroactive procedural and corrective laws (although I acknowledge the
difficulty in defining those categories). I am also not attempting to define the categories of “vested
rights” or that of “unvested rights.” Those are notoriously difficult and often useless exercises. See
supra note 214. But if I can’t precisely define the terms, neither has the Court of Appeals. See, e.g.,
Muskin v. State Dep’t of Assessments & Tax’n, 422 Md. 544, 30 A.3d 962 (2011); Dua v. Comcast
Cable of Md. Inc., 370 Md. 604, 805 A.2d 1061 (2002).
222. 209 Md. 328, 121 A.2d 473 (1956).
223. Doe, 430 Md. 535, 559–60, 62 A.3d 123, 137–38 (citing Braverman v. Bar Ass’n of Balt.,
209 Md. 328, 348, 121 A.2d 473, 483 (1956)). See supra note 165.
224. See supra notes 167–171.

